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CAN LIGHTNING STRIKE TWICE?
OBLIGATIONS OF STATE COURTS AFTER
PULLEY V. HARRIS
PENNY J. WHITE*
[D]eath sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.'
INTRODUCTION

Cleveland Turner, Jr., while engaged in an adulterous relationship, secured a gun and agreed to pay Curtis Lee
Henderson $2000 to kill his wife. Henderson killed Mrs.
Turner and was sentenced to death; Turner was sentenced to
life in prison. Neither man had any prior criminal record.
Turner's I.Q. was between 58 and 70; Henderson's was 68.
Both were tried by judges and juries in Talladega County, Alabama.2
James Floyd Smith, while masked and armed, entered a
liquor store in Georgia, pushed a customer to the floor, and began firing at the clerk of the store. The clerk shot back hitting
Smith's companion, Jimmy Don Hall. Smith eventually killed
the clerk. Both Smith and Hall had prior convictions, but the
only aggravating circumstance introduced in either case was
that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery.
Smith, the triggerman, received a life sentence; Hall was sen3
tenced to death.

Wallace M. Fugate III was convicted of murdering his
former wife of twenty years. Fugate claimed the shooting was
accidental, but the jury verdict supported a witness's account

* William J. Maier, Jr., Visiting Professor of Law, West Virginia University
College of Law; J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law; LL.M., Georgetown
University Law Center.
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2. See Henderson v. State, 616 So. 2d 348 (Ala. 1992). The Alabama
Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial judge for sentencing
reconsideration in light of the judge's failure to consider three mitigating
circumstances.
3. See Hall v. State, 244 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. 1978). The Georgia Supreme Court
vacated Hall's death sentence upon proportionality review as mandated in GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2537(c)(3) (1978).
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that Fugate intentionally assaulted and shot his wife as he
was attempting to remove her from her home. Fugate had no
criminal record, but was sentenced to death. 4 Frederick
Tokars, a prominent attorney in the same state, hired a man to
kill his wife. The hired killer kidnapped Mrs. Tokars and her
two children and shot her while the children watched. Tokars
received a life sentence. 5 Tokars had previously been convicted
in federal court in a case involving drug dealing and
racketeering.
Are these cases simply reflective of the aberrational outcomes expected occasionally from any capital scheme? 6 Do
they simply demonstrate that "there can be 'no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority
should be used to impose death.' ' 7 Or is there, or should there
be, a method to address and correct disproportionate death
sentences in a manner that would avoid the costly expense of
retrial?
The principle of proportionality in sentencing is difficult to
define. At its simplest, the principle forbids punishment that
is disproportionate to the offense. In order to determine
whether punishment is disproportionate to the offense, courts
consider society's "current judgment" with respect to the punishment as evidenced by legislative enactments and jury sentences. 8 The severity of the punishment, the probability of
arbitrary application, and the accomplishment of legitimate
penal objectives are also considered in assessing proportionality. 9 In determining the proportionality of a death sentence,
4. See Fugate v. State, 431 S.E.2d 104 (Ga. 1993).
5. See Former ProsecutorSpared Death Penalty in Georgia Court, DAILY
REC. (Baltimore), Mar. 14, 1997, at 27; Bill Rankin, Fairnessof the Death Penalty
Is Still on Trial: Some Say It's a Matter of Race, Money, Luck, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., June 29, 1997, at 13A.
6. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984).
7. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884 (1983) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
8. See Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam) (mem.)
(holding that the death penalty was unconstitutional for a kidnapping and rape
where the victim was not killed), rev'g 206 S.E.2d 12 (Ga. 1974); Hooks v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam) (mem.) (holding that the death penalty
was unconstitutional for robbery where victim was not killed), rev'g 210 S.E.2d
668 (Ga. 1974); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the death
penalty was per se disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of
rape of an adult woman).
9. These three principles, in addition to the level of acceptance by
contemporary society, were considered essential to the interpretation of the word
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however, the "Constitution contemplates .that in the end [the
Supreme Court's] own judgment will be brought to bear on the
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment." °
A recognition, among other things, that capital punishment in America was being applied arbitrarily led to the
United States Supreme Court's declaration in the 1972 case of
Furman v. Georgia" that the death penalty, as it was then
being applied by the states, violated the Eighth Amendment of
the Constitution. 12 In response, and in an effort to redraft
statutes that would not run afoul of the Constitution, death
penalty states devised various methods to attempt to make
their systems less arbitrary. Most states proposed a bifurcated
trial system with separate guilt and penalty phases. 13 Many
defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances as a means
to guide sentencing discretion, 14 while every state provided for
mandatory appellate review of death sentences. As part of
"excessive" in the Eighth Amendment by Justice Brennan in his opinion in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-80 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
10. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597.
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the
Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741 (1987);
Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908 (1982);
Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due
Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980); Robert Woll, Note, The Death
Penalty and Federalism: Eighth Amendment Constraints on the Allocation of
State DecisionmakingPower, 35 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1983).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. One year prior to Furman, the Court denied
relief in a case asserting that Fourteenth Amendment due process standards
required guided discretion in death cases. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183, 207 (1971) ("In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of
human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital
cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution."). One month following this
pronouncement, the Court granted certiorari in Furman and three companion
cases to determine if "the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty...
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Furman, 408 U.S. at 239. In later years, the Court's
picking and choosing would provide one basis for Justice Blackmun's discontent
with capital punishment jurisprudence. See Randall Coyne, Marking the Progress
of a Humane Justice: Harry Blackmun's Death Penalty Epiphany, 43 U. KAN. L.
REV. 367, 398-405 (1995). This began the Court's separate treatment of Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment challenges in death penalty cases-a separation that
is often not easy to understand. See Radin, supra note 11, at 1148; John C.
Shawde, Comment, JurisprudentialConfusion in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 38
U. MIAMI L. REV. 357 (1984).
13. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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that review, the appellate courts, under some schemes, were
obliged to consider whether death sentences were products of
bias, passion, or prejudice; and under others, whether the sentences were proportionate to the offenses, considering both the
15
offenses and the offenders.
Each of these methods potentially lessened the likelihood
of disproportionate death sentences. Still, none had more potential for eliminating disproportionality than an express provision requiring appellate courts to assess the proportionality
of death sentences in every case. Although appellate courts after Furman performed this task with varying degrees of scrutiny, each court had within its grasp the ability to assure that
the death penalty was administered fairly and that death sentences were proportionate.
Because in the majority of death penalty states juries determine the sentences, this appellate court review is essential.
Juries determine the sentences in the cases before them without reference to sentences imposed in similar cases. Thus, dissimilar results are bound to occur. The task of assuring that
the dissimilarities do not offend basic principles of fairness
must fall on those with knowledge of sentences in similar
cases, namely judges.
16
Through the process known as "proportionality review,"
which was created in post-Furman statutes, 17 most state appellate courts began to assess proportionality before affirming
death sentences.18 More recently, however, largely because of

15. Most states that imposed some kind of proportionality review modeled
their statutes after the Georgia statute that came before the Court in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). See infra notes 144-65 and accompanying text.
16. A proportionality review generally involves comparing similar cases to
ascertain whether the death penalty is an appropriate and proportionate
punishment. States that have conducted proportionality review have varied
widely on what they choose as "similar cases" as well as in how they conduct the
review.
See generally Lawrence S. Lustberg & Lenora M. Lapidus, The
Importance of Saving the Universe: Keeping ProportionalityReview Meaningful,
26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1423 (1996); Robert M. Carney, Comment, The Case for
Comparative ProportionalityReview, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1412 (1984); Bruce

Gilbert, Comment, Comparative ProportionalityReview: Will the Ends, Will the
Means, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 593 (1995); Gregory M. Stein, Comment,
DistinguishingAmong Murders When Assessing the Proportionalityof the Death
Penalty, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1786 (1985).
17. See infra notes 144-65 and accompanying text.
18. At one time, at least 30 of the 38 states with capital punishment laws
conducted some sort of proportionality review in accordance with statutory or
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the Supreme Court decision in Pulley v. Harris,19 which held
that proportionality review is not constitutionally mandated,
meaningful proportionality review has become increasingly
rare. Rather than conducting a meaningful comparison between similar cases, courts all too often simply state that a
particular death sentence is proportionate and cite previous
decisions without analyzing their similarities and differences,
20
or the appropriateness of the death sentence.
This article surveys that phenomenon and its likely consequence: the return to an arbitrary system of capital punishment. In Part I, the article explores the origin and purposes of
comparative proportionality review in capital cases. 21 In Part
II, it examines the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Gregg v. Georgia,22 which addressed several death penalty
schemes developed in the 1970s. The article, in Part III, then
focuses on the Supreme Court's conclusion in Pulley v. Harris
that comparative proportionality review is not required by the
Eighth Amendment. Part IV analyzes the effect that the Pulley decision had on states that had previously adopted comparative proportionality review by statute or as a matter of
judicial policy. In Part V, Pulley's deconstitutionalization is
contrasted with the Court's approach to proportionality con-

judicial mandate before affirming a death sentence. See infra note 143 and
accompanying text.
19. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
20. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
21. Although this article does not discuss different methods of
proportionality review, several noteworthy articles have done so. See, e.g., David
C. Baldus, When Symbols Clash: Reflections on the Future of the Comparative
ProportionalityReview of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1582 (1996);
David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical
Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); David
C. Baldus et al., Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A
Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980); Leigh B. Bienen, The
ProportionalityReview of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only
the "Appearanceof Justice?", 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130 (1996); Rhonda
Hartman, Critiquing Pennsylvania's Comparative Proportionality Review in
Capital Cases, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 871 (1991); Lustberg & Lapidus, supra note 16;
Carolyn Sievers Reed, The Evolution of North Carolina's Comparative
ProportionalityReview in Capital Cases, 63 N.C. L. REV. 1146 (1985); Carney,
supra note 16; Gilbert, supra note 16; Traci Smith, Note, The Outlier Case:
ProportionalityReview in State v. Rhines, 42 S.D. L. REV. 192 (1997); Steven M.
Sprenger, Note, A Critical Evaluation of State Supreme Court Proportionality
Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IOWA L. REV. 719 (1988); Stein, supra note
16.
22. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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cerns in related contexts, specifically the "excessive fines" and
punitive damages contexts, in which the Court has recognized
both procedural and substantive due process requirements. A
similar constitutional approach, it is suggested, is necessary in
death penalty cases unless we are to tolerate a skewed system
in which courts are more protective of excesses in the taking of
property than in the taking of life. Finally, in Part VI, this article concludes that state appellate courts have an obligation to
guard against a return to a system in which the imposition of
capital punishment is as random as a lightning strike. It further urges state court judges to assume the important role of
guardians of fairness in capital cases by conducting meaningful proportionality review in every capital case and setting
aside disproportionate death sentences accordingly.
I.

THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY

A basic principle of sentencing is that the punishment
should fit the crime.2 3 Proportionate sentences breed respect
for the law and its purposes. Implicit in the notion that the
punishment should fit the crime is that the character and culpability of the offender should be considered 24 along with the
nature of the offense.
The very language of the Eighth Amendment requires
proportionality in sentencing: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted." 25 By definition, the term "excessive" includes a proportionality component. 26 So too does the word

23. This phrase can be found as far back as Gilbert and Sullivan's THE
MIKADO of 1885. See generally Andrew Von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American
Criminal Sentencing Theory, 42 MD. L. REV. 6 (1983). As early as 1910, the
Supreme Court noted that "it is a precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to offense." Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
24. In most legislation requiring proportionality review of death sentences,
the statutes require that the court consider the sentence in light of the "crime
and the defendant." See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (1994); NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 29-2522(3) (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-12(3) (Michie 1988). See also
infra notes 144-65.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See generally Greenberg, supra note 11.
26. Webster's New World Dictionary defines "excess" as "action or conduct
that goes beyond the usual, reasonable, or lawful limit." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 473 (3d College ed. 1991). In Furman v.

Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Stewart contended that the death sentences
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Indeed, neither term has meaning absent com-

parison with something else. Thus, the Eighth Amendment
supports the basic notion that in a fair system of criminal justice, the punishment should be commensurate with the circumstances of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the nature of the crime.
This notion of proportionality pervaded each of the five
separate majority opinions in Furman v. Georgia,28 in which
the Court found that capital punishment, as it was being applied, violated the Eighth Amendment. Justice Douglas, for
example, concluded that implicit in the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment is the basic theme of equal protection of the law. 29 Thus, he concluded that the death penalty
would be unusual if it was administered in a manner that is
30
arbitrary or discriminatory.
[Wie deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to
the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determi-

before the Court were "'cruel' in the sense that they excessively go beyond, not in
degree but in kind, the punishments that the state legislatures have determined
to be necessary." Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. "Unusual" is defined as "not usual or common; rare; exceptional."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 1464 (3d College ed.
1991). Similarly, Justice Douglas explained in Furman that the death penalty is
"'unusual' if it discriminates ... by reason of... race, religion, wealth, social
position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the
play of such prejudices." 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
"A
penalty... should be considered 'unusually' imposed if it is administered
arbitrarily or discriminatorily." Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz,
Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1790
(1970).
28. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The Court issued a single paragraph per curiam
opinion holding that the "imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in
these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 239-40. Each Justice wrote a separate
opinion. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring);
id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at
405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 465
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Notably, both Justices Powell and ,Blacknmi
ultimately reversed their positions on the constitutionality of the death penalty.
See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.). Furman produced a plethora of legal literature. See, e.g., JOHN
C. JEFFERIES, JR. & JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., A BIOGRAPHY 451 (1994);
Burt, supra note 11; Greenberg, supra note 11.
29. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 244-45, 249 (Douglas, J., concurring).
30. See id. at 249.
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nation whether defendants committing these crimes should
die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.
... [The Eighth Amendment requires] legislatures to
write penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and
nonarbitrary, and to requirejudges to see to it that general
laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopulargroups.
...

[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in

their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and
discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea
of equal protection of the laws that
is implicit in the ban on
"cruel and unusual" punishments. 31
Justice Brennan also analyzed the Eighth Amendment's
32
use of the word "unusual." Relying on century-old precedent,
he concluded that in order to not violate the Eighth Amendment, punishment must be proportionate. Justice Brennan
proposed that four principles govern proportionality: (1) the
severity of the punishment; (2) the probability of arbitrary application; (3) the level of acceptance by contemporary society;
and (4) the accomplishment of legitimate penal purposes.3
Finding that capital punishment was inconsistent with all four
principles, 34 Brennan concluded that its infliction violated the
35
Eighth Amendment.
Similarly, Justice Marshall concluded that the death penalty was per se unconstitutional because it was excessive and

31. Id. at 253, 256-57 (emphasis added).
32. Justice Brennan noted that in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892),
the dissenting Justice Field concluded that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and

Unusual Punishment

Clause "is directed, not only against

[torturous

punishments], but against all punishments which by their excessive length or
severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged." Furman, 408 U.S.
at 279-80 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 339-40).
33. See Furman,408 U.S. at 270-80 (Brennan, J., concurring).
34. Justice Brennan reasoned that the death penalty is the most severe
form of punishment, that it is rarely imposed and therefore probably done so
arbitrarily, that it has been rejected by society as evidenced by the decline in
public executions and the rejection of certain methods of execution previously
used, and that there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal purpose more
effectively than other forms of punishment. See id.
35. See id. at 305-06.
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morally unacceptable. 36 In applying the "shocks the conscience" test to determine the societal acceptability of the
death penalty, Justice Marshall reasoned that the test must be
applied to "fully informed" American citizens 3 7-that is, those
who are fully aware of the purposes and liabilities of capital
punishment."' A fully informed citizenry, he concluded, would
find the death penalty morally unacceptable in light of its arbi39
trary and discriminatory application.
Justice Stewart found it unnecessary to determine
whether capital punishment was per se cruel and unusual
punishment. Rather, he focused on the application of capital
punishment under the statutes before the Court. Under those
statutes, capital punishment was being applied in an arbitrary
manner.40 Consequently, Justice Stewart reasoned that capital
punishment, as it was being applied, was cruel and unusual in
the same way that lightning strikes are cruel and unusual because a capriciously selected handful of persons are chosen to
die. 41 According to Justice Stewart, "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence
of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty
42
to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."
The fifth member of the majority, Justice White, concluded
that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional. Nonetheless, according to White, its application under the statutes
before the Court violated the Eighth Amendment because they
had ceased to accomplish the social ends they were intended to
serve.

43

Thus, while each Justice in the five-member majority had
separate bases for his conclusion, each consistently focused on
the theme of arbitrariness. As a result, when the states enacted new capital punishment statutes in response to Furman,
they attempted to address the problem of arbitrary and dis-

36. See id. at 350-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
37. See id. at 361.
38. See id. at 369.
39. See id. at 363-66.
40. See id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
41. See id. at 309-10.
42. Id. at 310.
43. See id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring). "[Als the statutes before us are
now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of
execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice." Id. at
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criminatory application in three ways: (1) drafting more specific standards for juries; (2) bifurcating capital proceedings;
and (3) implementing appellate-level proportionality review.44
First, the new statutes included standards for differentiating between life and death sentences. 45 In the majority of
states in which sentencing decisions were left to juries, prior
laws required juries to sentence without guidance as to what
factors to consider in their decision making. 46 In effect, sentencing decisions were a matter of complete jury discretion.
Therefore, to guide juries in the sentencing decisions, many
post-Furman state statutes defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances and set forth procedures according to which
jurors would determine whether defendants should be sentenced to life or death.47 If a jury determined that the state

44. See generally RANDALL COYNE & LYN
PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103-27 (1994).

ENTZEROTH,

CAPITAL

45. Many of the states followed the suggestions of the MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 201.6 (1980). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1999); GA. CODE
ANN. § 17-10-30 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1997); TEX. CODE CRIM. P.
ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1999).
46. See Furman,408 U.S. at 253-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
47. For example, the Georgia legislation, upon which many other statutes
are based, sets out 10 aggravating circumstances, provides that the jury can
consider any mitigating circumstance, and provides for a death sentence only if
the jury decides unanimously that the death penalty should be imposed. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1997). The 10 aggravating circumstances are:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital
felony;
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another
capital felony or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of
burglary or arson in the first degree;
(3) The offender, by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping,
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a
public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be
hazardous to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another
person, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of
monetary value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district
attorney or solicitor-general, or former district attorney, solicitor, or
solicitor-general was committed during or because of the exercise of his
or her official duties;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or
committed murder as an agent or employee of another person;
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had established at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance by the requisite burden of proof, the jury would then
consider any mitigating circumstances. 48 Thereafter, the jury
would weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to
49
determine the appropriate sentence.
Second, most of the states bifurcated capital proceedings
so that issues of punishment could be easily separated from
those of guilt.5° In the first phase of the trial, the guilt phase,

the jury would determine whether the state had established
guilt of a capital offense beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury
unanimously found guilt, the case would proceed to the penalty
phase.
The third method employed to eliminate arbitrariness in
the new statutes focused on appeal rights. Even when jury instructions defined the circumstances supporting a death sentence, jurors, whose job it was to decide single cases, had no
yardstick for measuring the appropriateness of capital punishment. In other words, they had no clear sense of proportionality. To address this concern, many statutes enacted after
Furman required appellate courts, as part of mandatory appellate review, to determine whether death sentences were
"excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases." 51

(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim;
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer,
corrections employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of
his official duties;
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has
escaped from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful
confinement; or
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering
with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful
confinement, of himself or another.
Id. Florida provides a specific list of both aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West Supp. 1999).
48. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30.
49. See, e.g., id.
50. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-2(C).
51. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (1994) ("Whether the sentence of
death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases .... "); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46b(b)(3) (1994) (repealed 1995) ("The
supreme court shall affirm ... unless it determines that.., the sentence is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases ....

");

DEL.
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Although appellate review provisions utilized in death
penalty states following Furmanwere directed at removing arbitrariness, they additionally addressed the need for heightened reliability that is so important in capital cases. From as
early as 1932, the Court had noted the distinct difference between a death sentence and a life sentence.5 2 That difference,
premised primarily on the absolute finality of death as a punishment, demanded heightened reliability in capital cases:
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment
than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year
or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination 53that death is the appropriate punishment in
a specific case.

This so-called heightened reliability required, among other
things, "searching appellate review," 54 which was indeed provided in post-Furmanstatutes.
II.

THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE

Four years after Furman, several of the revised death
penalty statutes made their way to the United States Supreme
Court under Eighth Amendment challenges. In five consoli-

CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(g)(2)(a) (1995) ('hether... the death penalty was
either arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended, or disproportionate to
").
the penalty recommended or imposed in similar cases.
52. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court deemed counsel to
be a constitutional requirement for indigents charged with capital offenses.
When the Court created a "special circumstances" approach to the issue of
counsel for indigent defendants, see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), being
charged with a capital offense was deemed a per se special circumstance. It was
not until 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), that counsel was
provided for noncapital indigent defendants.
53. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
54. Coyne, supra note 12, at 411; see also Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,
357 (1977). For a discussion of the "death is different" concept, see Burt, supra
note 11, at 1743-44.
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dated cases, 55 the Court determined the success of the states'
56
efforts to constitutionalize their capital punishment schemes.

55. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
56. Again, the lead case came from Georgia. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976). The Georgia statute at issue in the case, GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503
(Supp. 1975), after which many states modeled their statutory revisions, required
a bifurcated jury proceeding in which the issues of guilt and punishment were
separated. The sentencer was free to consider all mitigating facts and
circumstances, but only the aggravating circumstances that the state had
informed the sentencer of prior to trial. See id. § 27-2534.1(b). The death penalty
could be imposed only if at least one aggravating circumstance was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. § 27-2534.1(c).
A defendant sentenced to death was entitled to a mandatbry appeal. See id.
§ 27-2537(c). On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court was required to review the
transcript of the evidence, compare the evidence and sentence to those in similar
cases (a function that the jury was not equipped to accomplish), and determine
affirmatively whether "the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor," id. § 27-2537(c)(1), and whether
the sentence was "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant," id. § 27-2537(c)(3).
To facilitate this review, the statute required the trial court to report in
detail its observations as to guilt and punishment and whether race played a role
in the case. The Georgia Supreme Court was required to review the transcript
and report. If the court decided to affirm the death sentence, it was required to
list the "similar" cases considered in its decision. See id. § 27-2537().
The Florida statute at issue in the companion case, Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976), was similar. In Florida, the jury recommended a sentence, which
the trial judge could either accept or reject. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(2)
(West Supp. 1976-77).
Notwithstanding this difference, the case was still
bifurcated. At the penalty phase, the jury was required to find the existence of at
least one enumerated aggravating circumstance by clear and convincing evidence
to recommend a sentence of death. See id. § 921.141(3). In accepting or rejecting
the jury's recommended sentence, the trial judge was required to make written
findings. See id.
Although the Florida legislation was less specific about the requirements of
appellate review, it did require that the death penalty be reviewed to ensure that
it was not imposed on a "capriciously selected group." Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 258.
In fulfilling this obligation, the Florida Supreme Court deemed it its own
responsibility to assure that similar results were reached in cases with similar
facts. Thus, in its review, the court determined whether the sentence was
appropriate in light of other similar cases. See id. at 258-59. To do so, the court
reweighed the mitigating and aggravating circumstances and independently
assessed the appropriateness of the death penalty. See id. at 253. This helped to
remove arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, although not
statutorily mandated, the Florida Supreme Court was conducting the same kind
of proportionality review as that required in Georgia. At the time of Proffitt, the
Florida Supreme Court had vacated 8 out of 21 death sentences reviewed. See id.
Conversely, the Texas death penalty statute before the Court in the
companion case, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), had no mandatory appellate
review aimed at discovering disproportionate or arbitrary death sentences. See
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The three statutes at issue in Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v.
Florida, and Jurek v. Texas were illustrative of the states'
methods of appellate review adopted after Furman. All states
allowed appellate review of death sentences, and the majority
of the states followed Georgia in statutorily requiring their ap57
pellate courts to conduct comparative proportionality reviews.
In other states, such as Florida, the statutes were general and
did not mandate proportionality review; but many courts nonetheless conducted proportionality review as a matter of policy."' A few states, such as Texas, did not conduct propor-

TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 37.071 (West Supp. 1975-76). Further, the Texas
appellate courts imposed no review requirement. Like Georgia and Florida, the
Texas statute required a bifurcated proceeding, but the similarities ended there.
Rather than listing aggravating and mitigating circumstances to consider in
sentencing, the Texas statute posed questions to the jury after a finding of guilt
on a death-eligible offense. See id. If the questions were unanimously answered
in the affirmative, a death sentence was imposed. See id. Appellate review in the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not require proportionality review. See id.
art. 37.071(f). Nonetheless, in upholding the Texas statute, the United States
Supreme Court emphasized that the Texas statute "greatly narrowed" the
number of death-eligible defendants by its narrowed provisions for death and that
appellate review was in a court of statewide jurisdiction. See 428 U.S. at 268-70.
57. For example, Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington,
and Wyoming all required proportionality review by statute. See infra notes 14465 and accompanying text.
58. In addition to Florida, other states like Arizona, Arkansas, Indiana, and
on occasion, Illinois conducted proportionality review as a matter of judicial
policy. Although the review began as a matter of judicial policy in Florida, in
time the Florida Supreme Court deemed it a matter of state constitutional
mandate. In Tiliman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991), the court reasoned:
The requirement that death be administered proportionately has a
variety of sources in Florida law, including the Florida Constitution's
express prohibition against unusual punishments.
It clearly is
"unusual" to impose death based on facts similar to those in cases in
which death previously was deemed improper.
Moreover,
proportionality review in death cases rests at least in part on the
recognition that death is a uniquely irrevocable penalty, requiring a
more intensive level of judicial scrutiny or process than would lesser
penalties.
Proportionality review also arises in part by necessary implication
from the mandatory, exclusive jurisdiction this Court has over death
appeals. The obvious purpose of this special grant of jurisdiction is to
ensure the uniformity of death-penalty law by preventing the
disagreement over controlling points of law that may arise when the
district courts of appeal are the only appellate courts with mandatory
appellate jurisdiction. Thus, proportionality review is a unique and
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59
tionality review at all.
60
In finding that the Georgia, Florida, and Texas statutes
passed constitutional muster, the Supreme Court held that a
death sentence for the crime of murder was not per se disproportionate.6 1 Furman had mandated that the death penalty,
because of its uniqueness, could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that death
62
would be inflicted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
Thus, the Court focused on the need to suitably direct and
63
limit the discretion given to the sentencing body.
The Court acknowledged that a bifurcated proceeding reduces arbitrariness and capriciousness by eliminating prejudi64
cial evidence relevant only to sentencing from the guilt phase.
Nonetheless, a bifurcated proceeding alone cannot ensure fairness.6 5 Likewise, definite sentencing procedures and specified

highly serious function of this Court, the purpose of which is to foster
uniformity in death-penalty law.
Id. at 169 (citations omitted).
59. In addition to Texas, neither California nor Utah conducted
proportionality review, while Illinois did so only sparingly.
60. The death penalty statutes of Louisiana, see Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976), and North Carolina, see'Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976), were also under consideration by the Court. Both imposed mandatory
death sentences on individuals convicted of designated offenses. The Court
concluded that a mandatory death sentence designed to treat all people convicted
of a designated offense as "a faceless, undifferentiated mass" did nothing to
eliminate the constitutional deficiency of standardless sentencing. Woodson, 428
U.S. at 304.
61. In the Georgia case, the jury imposed a death sentence for robbery and
murder. The Georgia Supreme Court set aside the death sentence for the robbery
conviction. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162, 187 n.35 (1976).
62. See id. at 195.
63. See id. at 192-93.
64. See id. at 191-92.
65. In the companion case to McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971),
the Court rejected a claim that the Eighth Amendment required bifurcated trials:
It may well be... that bifurcated trials and criteria for jury
sentencing discretion are superior means of dealing with capital cases if
the death penalty is to be retained at all. But the Federal Constitution,
which marks the limits of our authority in these cases, does not
guarantee trial procedures that are the best of all worlds, or that accord
with the most enlightened ideas of students of the infant science of
criminology, or even those that measure up to the individual
predilections of members of this Court. The Constitution requires no
more than that trials be fairly conducted and that guaranteed rights of'
defendants be scrupulously respected. From a constitutional standpoint
we cannot conclude that it is impermissible for a State to consider that
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aggravating and mitigating circumstances narrow discretion,
but do not assure proportionate sentencing. Juries, unskilled
in sentencing, 66 might still impose death sentences in inappropriate cases.
As a check against that likelihood, the Court noted that
appellate courts, experienced in sentencing, can review each
case to assure that the death penalty is not freakishly imposed. 67 Turning specifically to the Georgia scheme at issue in
Gregg, the Court lauded Georgia's appellate review procedure,
which required mandatory proportionality review: "The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sentencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty [and] substantially eliminates
the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury."68 Similarly, in Proffitt, the Court
noted that Florida had "in effect adopted the type of proportionality review mandated by the Georgia statute." 69 Although
Texas had no similar statutory or court-imposed system, the
Court noted in Jurek that "[bly providing prompt judicial review... in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and
70
consistent imposition of death sentences under law."
This reliance on appellate review to remove arbitrariness
was emphasized by the concurring Justice White in Gregg as
well.7 1 Specifically, White emphasized that the Georgia statutory procedure purportedly assured that the proportionality
review would be meaningful. As the majority elaborated, trial
judges were statutorily required to prepare reports "designed
to elicit information about the defendant, the crime, and the

the compassionate purposes of jury sentencing in capital cases are better
served by having the issues of guilt and punishment determined in a
single trial than by focusing the jury's attention solely on punishment
after the issue of guilt has been determined.
Id. at 221 (citation omitted). Neither Furman nor any other Supreme Court
decision has held otherwise.
66. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-92.
67. See id. at 195.
68. Id. at 206.
This review of similar cases was first dubbed
"proportionality review" by Justice Stewart in Gregg. See id.
69. 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976).
70. Id. at 276. For one author's view that the statute in Jurek did not even
approximate a carefully drafted statute aimed at eliminating disparity and
arbitrariness, see Burt, supra note 11, at 1777.
71. See 428 U.S. at 222-24 (White, J., concurring).
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circumstances of the trial."72 Those reports, in the opinion of

the concurrence, required characterizations by the trial judge
that were "designed to test for arbitrariness and disproportionality of sentence." 73 Because the statute also required the
Supreme Court of Georgia to preserve the record in all capital

cases, it authorized the appointment of an assistant and the
hiring of staff members to assist the court in accumulating and
74
preserving the records.

III.

A PRINCIPLE TURNED OPTION: PULLEY V. HARRIS

Eight years after the Supreme Court approved the systems
at work in Georgia, Florida, and Texas, and emphasized that
guided discretion and meaningful appellate review made state
death penalty statutes constitutionally satisfactory, the Court
faced the issue of whether comparative proportionality review
was a constitutional prerequisite to meaningful appellate review. In the 1984 case of Pulley v. Harris,75 a California petitioner challenged the constitutionality of his death sentence
under the California capital punishment scheme, which did not
require proportionality review. Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, concluded that the California statute was nonetheless
constitutional since the Eighth Amendment did not require
mandatory appellate proportionality review.76
A.

The Precursorsto Pulley v. Harris

Traditionally, the concept of proportionality refers to an
"abstract evaluation of the appropriateness of a sentence for a
particular crime." 7 In determining proportionality in that con72.

Id. at 167 (majority opinion citing GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537(a) (Supp.

1975)). The report was required to be served upon defense counsel. See id. at
168.
73. Id. at 167.
74. See id. at 167 n.10.
75. 465 U.S. 37 (1984). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
previously granted Harris habeas relief, finding that comparative proportionality
review was constitutionally required. See id. at 40. The Supreme Court granted
the state's petition for certiorari, which argued that comparative proportionality
review was not required by the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See id. at 41.
76. See id. at 45.

77. Id. at 42-43. The Connecticut Supreme Court, in wrestling with a
definition, has suggested that "traditional proportionality" involves
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text, the Pulley Court said that an examination of the gravity
of the offense, the severity of the penalty, and the sentencing
practices in other jurisdictions must be probed. Based on those
factors, the Court had previously stricken sentences as being
78
disproportionate to the crime under the Eighth Amendment.
Those Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges,
however, had not always arisen in capital contexts. In only
one murder case,7 9 Enmund v. Florida-8 0 which was decided
two years before Pulley, had the Court assessed the proportionality of a death sentence. In Enmund, the Court recognized explicitly that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause is "directed, in part, 'against all
punishments which by their excessive length or severity are
greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged."' 8 1
Enmund had been convicted and sentenced to death under
a Florida law that imposed the death penalty on a "constructive aider and abettor" in a first degree murder case. 82 The two
victims, an elderly couple, were killed by two individuals who
came to the couple's farmhouse door and requested water for
an overheated car. 83 The strongest evidence against Enmund

[1]ooking to the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty, to
sentences imposed for other crimes, and to sentencing practices in other
jurisdictions .... [It] is simply another term for analysis under either
the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment or under our state constitutional counterpart ....
State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 208 (Conn. 1996) (citations omitted).
78. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 43. The post-Furman,-pre-PulleyCourt had on
limited occasions faced an Eighth Amendment proportionality challenge to death
and nondeath sentences. In the nondeath context, the Court reviewed the
imposition of a life sentence for obtaining money by false pretenses in Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). Rummell was convicted of obtaining $120.75 by false
pretenses. Because he was a repeat offender, having previously been convicted
for fraudulent use of a credit card and passing a forged check, a life sentence was
mandated by Texas law. See id. at 266. Noting that the defendant would be
eligible for parole in approximately 12 years, see id. at 280, the Court upheld the
sentence against the constitutional challenge, see id. at 285. It reasoned that as a
recidivist, Rummel had demonstrated a disregard for conforming to the laws of
society. See id. at 284. The Court, therefore, found no merit to petitioner's
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claims. See id. at 285.
79. The Court had concluded that a death sentence was disproportionate
punishment for the crime of rape. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
80. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
81. Id. at 788 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910)
(quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting))).
82. See id. at 788.
83. See id. at 784.
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supported an inference that he was sitting in a car at the side
of the road approximately 200 yards from the farmhouse at the
4
time of the killing.
The Court analyzed the punishment in the case by looking
to the "historical development of the punishment at issue, legislative judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing
decisions juries have made." 85 That review led the Court to
conclude that imposition of the death penalty on an accomplice
who did not kill and had no intention of killing the two victims
"does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just deserts."8 6 Because the
state court treated the defendants, who intentionally caused
harm, the same as it treated Enmund, who did not intentionally cause harm, thereby attributing their culpability to him,
the Court overturned the Florida death sentence as a violation
8
of the Eighth Amendment. 1

84. See id. at 786 (citing Enmund v. State, 399 So. 2d 1362, 1370 (Fla.
1981)).
85. Id. at 788. Only eight of the states-that imposed the death penalty
would have allowed a death sentence for a defendant in Enmund's circumstances.
Furthermore, none of the eight jurisdictions that had authorized capital
punishment by new legislation after Furman, would have allowed the imposition
of the death penalty under similar circumstances. Thus, the Court concluded
that the status of legislative judgment weighed against capital punishment in the
case. See id. at 789-93. Furthermore, the Court found that jury decisions were in
accord with the majority of legislative judgments and that juries had "repudiated
imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as petitioner's." Id. at 794.
Finally, turning to explore its own convictions about the imposition of the death
penalty in this case, the majority stressed that the "focus must be on [the
defendant's] culpability, not on that of those who committed the robbery and shot
the victims, for we insist on 'individualized consideration as a constitutional
requirement in imposing the death sentence,' which means that we must focus on
'relevant facets of the character and record of the individualized offender.'" Id. at
798 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 801. The culpability limitations set forth in Enmund were altered
in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), in which the Court held that "major
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to
human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement." Id. at
158 (footnote omitted). The Tison brothers assisted their father and another
convict in breaking out of an Arizona prison. See id. at 137. After the prison
break, they encountered automobile problems and commandeered the car of a
family of four. See id. at 139-40. During the course of the robbery, the father and
his fellow convict brutally murdered the four victims while the brothers watched.
See id. at 141. Although the brothers testified that the shooting "surprised"
them, they did nothing to stop it or assist the victims. See id.
87. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
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In the.year following Enmund, and one year prior to Pulley, the Court addressed proportionality again, albeit in a noncapital context. In Solem v. Helm, 88 a defendant was sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for committing a seventh nonviolent felony. 89 Before applying the
Enmund proportionality test, the Court traced the origins of
the proportionality principle to the Magna Carta and noted
that its provisions and those of the First Statute of Westminister had been used to invalidate disproportionate punishments. 90 Noting that the principle had been recognized for
almost a century in this country, 91 the Court proclaimed that
the Eighth Amendment "prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the
crime committed."92 The Court stated: "We hold as a matter of
principle that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the
crime for which the defendant has been convicted." 93 According to the Court, Solem's life sentence was disproportionate to
the offense and thus ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment.

88. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
In the case, Helm was sentenced to life
imprisonment as a result of his recidivist status in South Dakota. See id. at 282.
He had been convicted of six nonviolent felonies consisting of three burglaries,
one grand larceny, one obtaining money under false pretenses, and a third offense
of driving under the influence. See id. at 279-80. His instant offense, which
yielded the life sentence, was for uttering a bad check for $100, an offense which
would ordinarily carry a five-year prison sentence. See id. at 281.
89. Helm challenged his sentence solely on Eighth Amendment grounds.
See id. at 283-84.
90. See id. at 284-85. The Magna Carta's requirement that "'amercements'
may not be excessive" was deemed to be the root of the principle. Id. (footnotes
omitted). For the specific language of the provisions, see id. at 284 n.9.
91. The Solem Court noted that proportionality review was first recognized
and employed by a Court minority in 1892 in the case of O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (finding a sentence of 19,914 days
for selling liquor without a license to be excessive). See Solem, 463 U.S. at 286
n.11. The Court, however, then went on to describe Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910), as the leading case recognizing proportionality review. See
Solem, 463 U.S. at 286-87.
92. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284.
93. Id. at 290. In Solem, Justice Powell, who delivered the opinion for a
five-member majority, steered away from the notion that the Eighth Amendment
proportionality analysis was applicable only in capital cases because "death is
different." Citing a 1615 case of the King's Bench, Justice Powell found that the
Eighth Amendment principle "clearly applied to prison terms." Id. at 289 (citing
Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rep. 1015 (K.B. 1615)). He likewise found support for
the proposition in prior cases of the Supreme Court. See id. at 290 (citing Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
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Although neither Solem nor Enmund raised the issue of
comparative proportionality review by name, the identification
of the "objective criteria" for proportionality review clearly established that the Court was not writing on a blank slate when
Pulley arose. The Court had explicitly recognized that the
Constitution required proportionate sentences and that proportionality was to be assessed by, among other things, reviewing sentencing decisions in similar cases. In Enmund, the
Court's review included a comparison of Enmund's culpability
with those of his codefendants, 94 as well as a comparison of his
sentence with those available in other jurisdictions.9 5 Likewise, in Solem, the Court compared the South Dakota sentence
to sentences in similar cases from other jurisdictions. 96 Thus,
the concept of comparative 97 proportionality review was implicit in the constitutional principle the Court recognized in
both of those cases and in the tests the Court employed. Nonetheless, when the issue of the constitutionality of comparative
proportionality review was squarely presented in Pulley, the
Court chose to separate the proportionality principle into two
separate notions: traditional proportionality and comparative
proportionality.
B. Dividing the ProportionalityPrinciple:Traditionaland
ComparativeProportionality
After reviewing its proportionality jurisprudence in capital
and noncapital contexts, 98 the Court attempted to distinguish
the sort of proportionality review sought in Pulley from that
previously engaged in by the Court. 99 The "traditional" kind of
proportionality review in which a court asks whether the sentence is disproportionate to the offense was not at issue in Pulley. Rather, at issue was "comparative" proportionality in

94. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
95. See id. at 789-95.
96. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 291-92.
97. To determine proportionality, a court must compare.
98. In addition to citing Enmund and Solem, the Court cited Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), a case that deemed death a disproportionate
penalty for rape. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984).
99. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 43.
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which the sentence imposed is compared to sentences of others
convicted of the same crime.100
It is easy to understand why the Court divided the proportionality principle at issue in Pulley. Had it not done so, the
Court would have been limited to two unattractive choices.
First, a decision that comparative proportionality review was
constitutionally mandated would have called the death penalty
and dozens of death sentences in several states into question.
On the other hand, a decision that the Eighth Amendment had
no proportionality component at all would have required reversal of precedent and would have been historically and intellectually indefensible.
Although the reason for the division is understandable, it
is not intellectually sound. Both Solem and Enmund included
considerations of comparative proportionality. In Solem, for
example, the Court noted that "it may be helpful to compare
the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or
to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive." 10 1 In Enmund, the Court
compared the culpability of all death row inmates in the nation
with the culpability of Enmund. 10 2 Both cases recognized that
the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition not only of barbaric or torturous punishments, but of disproportionate punishments as well. 10 3
Thus, although a part of the
proportionality inquiry focused on the nature of the crime and
the culpability of the defendant and would thus be tagged "traditional" proportionality, the Court in both pre-Pulley cases
also compared the sentences with those imposed for similar
crimes in other jurisdictions. By doing so, the Court accepted
the reality that determining proportionality requires more
than a consideration of the particular offense and the offender.
To truly determine proportionality, a sentence must be viewed

100. This is just the type of proportionality review required by step three of
the Solem analysis and, in fact, engaged in by the Court in Solem when it

concluded that "Helm was treated more severely than he would have been in any
other State." Solem, 463 U.S. at 300.
101. Id. at 291.
102.
103.

See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795-96.
See Solem, 463 U.S. at 284; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788.
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in light of other sentences; in other words, it must be compared.

04

C. A Retreat from ProportionalityPrecedent
Thus, before Pulley, the Court had not only acknowledged
that the Constitution required proportionality in sentencing,
but also had recognized that assuring proportionality required
comparing sentences in similar cases. 105 The issue in Pulley
was whether a state system that did not include comparative
proportionality review was constitutional, not the constitutionality of a particular disproportionate sentence. In resolving
that issue, the Court retreated from its prior solid commitment
to the constitutional principle of proportionality and foreshadowed where some Justices would try to take the Court a few
06
years later.
In justifying its conclusion that the Constitution did not
mandate comparative proportionality review, Justice White,
writing for the Pulley majority, first revisited Gregg, Proffitt,
and Jurek, and concluded that the decisions in those consolidated cases soundly resolved the issue before the Court. 07
Downplaying the emphasis on appellate proportionality review
in Georgia (by statute) and in Florida (by court decision),
White concluded that the Court's approval of the Texas capital
scheme in Jurek, which had no statutory or court-imposed proportionality review, established that comparative08 proportionality review was not a constitutional requirement.
104. Although it is true that the Court conducted its comparative
proportionality review in Solem by comparing the South Dakota sentence to
sentences in all the other states, the nature of the case before it (mandatory
sentencing under South Dakota law) rendered that method the only appropriate
comparison. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 298-300.
105. See id. at 291; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795-96. Interestingly, in a much
earlier traditional proportionality decision, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910), in which the Court deemed a sentence of 15 years of hard labor and

expatriation as cruel and unusual, the Court compared the sentence in Weems's
case to sentences for more serious crimes. See id. at 380-81.
106. In 1991, in an opinion penned by Justice Scalia, two members of the
Court concluded that "Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment contains

no proportionality guarantee." Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991).
107.

See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45-50.

108. See id. at 50-51. White failed to mention the Court's emphasis in Jurek
on the very narrow application of the death penalty given the statutory definition

of capital murder, or the Court's applauding of "prompt judicial review ... in a
court of statewide jurisdiction [as a means of] promot[ing]

the evenhanded,
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Secondly, Justice White deemed the petitioner's reliance
on Zant v. Stephens 0 9 to be misplaced. In Zant, the Court had
upheld a death sentence even though one of the aggravating
circumstances found by the jury was held to be unconstitutionally vague." ° In upholding the death sentence, the Zant Court
relied on the "mandatory appellate review," which assured
proportionality."' The Zant Court emphasized:
Our decision in this case depends in part on the existence of
an important procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each death sentence by the Georgia Supreme
Court to avoid arbitrariness and to assure proportionality.... As we noted in Gregg, we have also been assured
that a death sentence will be vacated if it is excessive or
substantially disproportionate to the penalties that have
been imposed under similar circumstances." 2
In true revisionist style, this strong language in Zant endorsing the importance of proportionality review was reduced
to nothingness in Pulley. It was, according to the Pulley Court,
the finding of other aggravating circumstances in Zant, not the
appellate court finding of proportionality, that "adequately differentiated [the] case in an objective, evenhanded, and sub3
stantively rational way.""
This reading of Zant is particularly troublesome because
many years prior to Zant the Court, in Stromberg v. California," 4 held that a general verdict relying on either of two aggravating circumstances must be set aside if either

rational, and consistent imposition of the death sentences under law." Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1984).
109. 462 U.S. 862 (1983). Petitioner argued that Zant supported a holding
that proportionality review was constitutionally mandated.
110. At sentencing, the State had urged the jury to find three aggravating
circumstances: (1) an offense committed by one with "substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions"; (2) murder that was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman"; and (3) murder that was committed by one who
had escaped from lawful custody. Id. at 865 n.1 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 272534.1(b) (1978)). The jury found the first and third circumstances, but made no
finding on the second. While the appeal was pending, the state supreme court
held the first circumstance to be unconstitutionally vague. See Arnold v. State,
224 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. 1976).
111. Zant, 462 U.S. at 890.
112. Id. at 890 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
113. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 50 n.12 (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 879).
114. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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In distinguishing the situation

presented in Zant, in which one of the aggravating circumstances supporting the death penalty was set aside, the Zant
Court relied specifically on the presence of proportionality review as a safeguard against an inappropriate sentence." 5 Yet,
when relied upon in Pulley, the Zant decision was recast as one
which focused instead on the validity of the remaining aggravating circumstance.
At his third level of inquiry, Justice White looked to the
California statute at issue in Pulley." 6 That statute narrowed
the number of death-eligible defendants by its definition of
capital murder. It further provided guided discretion on sentencing, which controlled arbitrariness. Thus, Justice White
concluded, "[a] ssuming that there could be a capital sentencing
system so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness that it
would not pass constitutional muster without comparative
proportionality review, the 1977 California statute is not of
that sort."117 Noting that all capital sentencing schemes might
produce aberrational outcomes, White concluded that such "inconsistencies are a far cry from the major systemic defects
identified in Furman.""8 Furthermore, because no perfect procedure for determining who should be sentenced to death could
be devised, White concluded that California's capital scheme
was wholly acceptable even without appellate proportionality
review.
D. The Remnants of Comparative ProportionalityReview
After Pulley," 9 a number of conclusions regarding proportionality review are certain. First, traditional proportionality

115. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 890.
116. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1977).
117. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 51.
118. Id. at 54.
119. In the few years after the Pulley decision, the Court found Eighth
Amendment bars to the implementation of the death penalty in two other
contexts. First, in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment would not tolerate the execution of one proven to be
insane at the time of the execution. See id. at 408-10. Later, in Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989),
the Court concluded "that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the
execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her
offense," Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (footnote omitted), but that "the imposition
of capital punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age...
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review is still a constitutional mandate, but its application is
very narrow. 12 0 Indeed, in distinguishing between traditional
proportionality review and the comparative proportionality review sought in Pulley, the Pulley Court only recognized the
constitutional underpinnings of the former. 121 Seven years
later, in the fractured Harmelin v. Michigan'2 2 decision, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality, would deem traditional proportionality review to exist only as part of the "death is
different" jurisprudence. 2 3 Although Justice Scalia's opinion
commanded a majority for purposes of upholding the sentence
as proportionate, three Justices, concurring in result only,
noted their contrary position that the Eighth Amendment "for-

does not offend the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment," Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
In another case alleging an Eighth Amendment violation due to lack of
sufficient culpability, the Court adjusted the Enmund "intent to kill" standard to
authorize the death penalty for anyone who was a major participant in the felony
and who had reckless indifference to human life. See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987); see also supra note 86.
. 120. After Pulley, the Court further retreated in the area of proportionality
review in the case of McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). There, despite
evidence that established a significant disparity in the imposition of the death
penalty in Georgia based on the race of the victim, the Court denied relief and
held that in order to prevail on the claim, a petitioner would have to prove that
the decision makers acted with a discriminatory purpose. Because of the
stringency of this test, state courts may feel less inclined to take racial
discrimination challenges seriously. See generally Samuel R. Cross & Robert
Mauro, Patternsof Death:An Anlaysis of Racial Disparitiesin Capital Sentencing
and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984); Frederick J. Bendremer
et al., Comment, McCleskey v. Kemp: Constitutional Tolerance for Racially
DisparateCapital Sentencing, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 295 (1986); Jacqueline Cook,
Note, McCleskey v. Kemp Coming Full Circle: A Return to Arbitrary Sentencing
Patternsin Capital Punishment Cases, 56 UMKC L. REV. 387 (1988).
121. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 43.
122. 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (plurality opinion).
123. In Harmelin, the defendant argued that his life sentence without
parole for possessing 627 grams of cocaine violated the Eighth Amendment. After
examining the application of the Solem factors to Harmelin, Justice Scalia
concluded that "[p]roportionality review is one of several respects in which we
have held that 'death is different,' and have imposed protections that the
Constitution nowhere else provides." Id. at 994; see also supra note 106 and
accompanying text. Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter concurred with the
result in the case, but maintained that the "Eighth Amendment does not require
strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather it forbids only extreme
sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
1001 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 303). In dissent, Justice White, joined by
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, defended the application of the Solem factors
and assailed Justice Scalia's attempt to remove proportionality as an element of
general Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See id. at 1009.
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bids... extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate'
to the crime." 124 Thus, what has been named "traditional" proportionality still exists as a constitutional prerequisite to valid
criminal sentences, including a death sentence.12 5
Perhaps less absolute, but extremely significant, is the
conclusion that Pulley did not foreclose Eighth Amendment attacks on death sentences that are comparatively disproportionate. Even more important, it did not remove the Eighth
Amendment as the basis for relief from a comparatively disproportionate death sentence. Whether the Constitution mandates a particular type of appellate review and whether the
Constitution forbids disproportionate sentences are two very
different issues. A holding that the Constitution does not require a state to undergo a particular type of appellate review
differs substantially from a holding that the Constitution does
not provide relief for one whose sentence, by definition, is
grossly disproportionate to sentences from similar cases. Indeed, were Pulley to be read to foreclose the latter proposition,
much of the Court's past heightened reliability jurisprudence
126
would be undermined.
In addition to not foreclosing viable Eighth Amendment
challenges, Pulley did not discuss nor foreclose a Fourteenth
Amendment due process analysis. 27 Since Pulley involved a
challenge to a state court judgment, the Eighth Amendment
was applicable only as incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment;12s however, it was the substantive Eighth
Amendment limitations that were addressed in the case. In
fact, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and un-

124. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part & in
judgment) (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288, 303).
125. The change since Pulley in the composition of the Court further
complicates an assessment of the Court's present view on traditional
proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment.
126. See Coyne, supra note 12, at 411 (stating that because death is
different, "[slearching appellate review of death sentences and their underlying
convictions [are] indispensable components of a constitutional death penalty

scheme" (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (footnote
omitted))).
127. Nor did Pulley address or foreclose an equal protection challenge. But
see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); supra note 120.

128.

The protections .of the Eighth Amendment apply to the states by virtue

of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 n.1
(1972).

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

usual punishment was the sole basis of the Pulley decision.
The Court did not address the substantive or procedural due
process limitations on sentences. Nonetheless, the Court's
more than a decade long trek through both substantive and
procedural due process analyses related to excessive punitive
damages awards, and its recent first journey into the Excessive
Fines Clause suggest that a due process analysis is not only
12 9
applicable to capital cases, but is in fact essential.
Another certainty of Pulley is that statutory provisions,
like those in Georgia requiring that appellate review include
comparative proportionality review, are not required by the
United States Constitution. 130 That diminution in the status of
comparative proportionality review has led to a reduction in
the incentive for state appellate courts to review capital cases
to assure proportionality, 131 and arguably to an increase in the
132
number of affirmed disproportionate death sentences.
Although Pulley disavowed a particular appellate system,
it nonetheless acknowledged that capital sentencing schemes
must include "checks on arbitrariness." 133 Thus, a system with
insufficient checks on either the narrowing of capital offenses
or on death eligibility might be unconstitutional without appellate proportionality review. Finally, while Pulley established that a system similar to that prescribed in the 1977
California statute 34 was not a system devoid of sufficient

129. See infra Part V.
130. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 50-51.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 185-92.
132. See Burt, supra note 11, at 1784 (suggesting that Pulley was the
Court's signal to state courts that state death cases would no longer be strictly
scrutinized in the federal courts).
133. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 51.
134. See Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty
Scheme: Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283 (1997), for a thorough
discussion of the California death penalty statutes. The "other safeguards
against arbitrariness" present in the California statute included a statutory
requirement that trial judges independently review and weigh the evidence in
death cases to determine if the weight of the evidence supports the jury's
findings; that trial judges state the reasons for their findings on the record; and
that appellate judges conduct mandatory appellate review of the evidence
"assurfing] thoughtful and effective appellate review, focusing upon the
circumstances present in each particular case." Pulley, 465 U.S. at 52-53 (quoting
People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 609 (Cal. 1979)).
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checks on arbitrariness, it failed to address which components'
135
absence would result in an insufficient system.
IV.

COMPARATIVE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW: PRE- AND
POST-PULLEY

After the Supreme Court removed the constitutional mandate for comparative proportionality review in Pulley, 36 the
imposition of disproportionate death sentences continued and,
indeed, may have increased. One need look no further than
the factual scenarios detailed in the introduction of this article
for proof that the death penalty continued to be meted out in
arbitrary, disproportionate ways after Pulley was decided. Examples of cases in which codefendants are treated disproportionately with the least culpable receiving the death sentence
are not rare. Similarly, there are many cases in which almost
identical defendants commit almost identical crimes, but are
sentenced differently. Indeed, within the, reported decisions of
most death penalty states are examples of cases in which the
fact finder, be it judge or jury, imposed a disproportionate
death sentence. 37 On occasion before Pulley, the appellate
courts in most states (when their statutes mandated) would
step in and correct what would otherwise have been a tragic
injustice by reducing a disproportionate death sentence to life
imprisonment. 38 However, Pulley's removal of what was be39
lieved to be proportionality's constitutional underpinning,
coupled with the politically charged climate that surrounds

135. For example, it has been suggested that New Jersey's appellate system
"contains no appellate review safeguards whatsoever [other than discretionary
proportionality review]." Lustberg & Lapidus, supra note 16, at 1461.
136. The Court acknowledged that a system otherwise lacking in
meaningful checks on arbitrariness might require comparative proportionality
review. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
137. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
138. See infra note 170.
139. See State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 205 (Conn. 1996) '(noting that "until
1984, it was generally believed that any capital punishment statute that did not
provide for proportionality review was constitutionally vulnerable" (quoting State
v. Cobb, 663 A.2d 948, 954 (Conn. 1995))).
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most capital cases 140 are undermining Furman's mandate for
4
nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory death penalty schemes.' '
A.

Pre-PulleyState Court ComparativeProportionality
Review

The overarching theme of Furman-thatthe death penalty
as it was then being administered was cruel and unusual because of its arbitrary and capricious application-coupled with
the Court's applauding of the revised systems in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek,'142 led most states to follow Georgia's lead after
Furman and impose comparative proportionality review as a
For most states, the remandatory appellate procedure. 4
quirement was statutorily imposed. The pertinent statutory
language often tracked Georgia's requirement that an appellate court determine "[wihether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." 4 4 In

140. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital
Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995).
141. The situation is worsened by the fact that the Supreme Court has
sanctioned cavalier approaches to capital cases in general. See generally Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (finding that relief for one who claims actual
innocence though sentenced to death is through state executive clemency);
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758-59 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the Court's approach as "erect[ing] petty procedural barriers" to
state prisoners who assert federal constitutional claims, "creating a Byzantine
morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impediments to the
vindication of federal rights"); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 990 (1983)
(allowing state courts to apply harmless error doctrine in capital cases in which
clear error is found).
142. As previously noted, even though Texas had no comparative
proportionality review provision, the Court stressed that appeals were handled by
a court with statewide jurisdiction, which promoted the "evenhanded, rational
and consistent imposition of death sentences under law." Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 276 (1976).
143. At the time of Pulley, Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming had statutes or constitutional
provisions that provided for proportionality review. See infra notes 144-65 and
accompanying text. Arkansas, Florida, and Arizona conducted reviews, but
without statutory mandate. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text; see
also supra note 58.
144.

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35 (1997).
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145
fact, almost that precise language was adopted in Alabama,
5
49
1
8
14
Maryland, Mississippi, 0
Idaho,' 46 Kentucky, 147 Louisiana,
Nebraska, 151 Nevada, 152 New Hampshire, 53 New Jersey, 5 4 New
Mexico, 55 North Carolina, 156 Ohio,' 57 Oklahoma, 5 8 South Carolina, 159 South Dakota, 160 Tennessee, 161 Virginia, 162 Washington, 163 and Wyoming, 64 while a few other states used
165
somewhat different language with the same effect.

145. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-53(b)(3) (1994); Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645
(Ala. 1980).
146. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2827(c)(3) (1987) (amended in 1994 to eliminate
disproportionate language); State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463 (Idaho 1983).
147. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3)(c) (Michie 1990); Matthews v.
Commonwealth, 709 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. 1986).
148. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.9.1(c) (West 1997); State v.
Martin, 376 So. 2d 300 (La. 1979).
149. See MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 414(e) (1978) (repealed 1992); Tichnell v.
State, 468 A.2d 1 (Md. 1983).
150. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (Supp. 1998); Coleman v. State,
378 So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1979).
151. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522(3) (1995).
152. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.055(2)(d) (1984) (amended in 1985 to
eliminate disproportionate language); Harvey v. State, 682 P.2d 1384 (Nev. 1984).
153. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5.XI(c) (1996).
154. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(e)(6) (West 1995).
155. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4C (Michie Supp. 1994); State v. Garcia,
664 P.2d 969 (N.M. 1983).
156. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1997); State v. Lawson, 314
S.E.2d 493 (N.C. 1984).
157. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A) (Anderson 1996); State v.
Steffen, 509 N.E.2d 383 (Ohio 1987).
158. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.13(C)(3) (1983) (repealed 1985); Foster v.
State, 714 P.2d 1031 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
159. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25(c)(3) (Law Co-op. 1985); State v.
Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63 (S.C. 1982).
160. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-12(3) (Michie 1988).
161. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-206(2)(c)(1)(D) (1997); State v. Barber,
753 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. 1988).
162. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1(C)(2) (Michie 1996) (repealed 1998);
Stamper v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 808 (Va. 1979).
163. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(2)(b) (West 1995); State v.
Harris, 725 P.2d 975 (Wash. 1986).
164. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-103(d)(iii) (Michie 1977) (changed to § 6-2103(d)(iii) and repealed in 1989); Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43 (Wyo. 1983).
165. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-46b(b)(3) (1994) (repealed 1995) (providing
that a court "shall affirm ... unless it determines that.., the sentence is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the
defendant"); State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4209(g)(2)(a) (1995) (providing that a court shall consider "[w]hether,
considering the totality of evidence ... the death penalty was either arbitrarily or
capriciously imposed or recommended, or disproportionate to the penalty
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Still other states, such as Arkansas and Arizona, followed
Florida's lead in judicially adopting a policy of conducting comparative proportionality review. Although those states' capital
punishment statutes 66 did not require any particular type of
appellate review, the courts engaged in comparative proportionality review nonetheless "to assure evenhandedness in the
1 67
application of the death penalty."
Despite specific statutory language in some states, most
states conducted comparative proportionality review by comparing the circumstances of the case before a court with the
circumstances of other murder cases in which either a death
sentence or a life sentence had been imposed. 68 Although

recommended or imposed in similar cases arising under this section"); Flamer v.
State, 490 A.2d 104 (Del. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035(3) (West Supp. 1999)
(providing that a court shall consider "[wihether the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime, the strength of the evidence and the defendant"); State v. Griffin,
756 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-310(c) (Supp. 1998)
(providing that a court shall consider "[wihether the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in other cases in which a
sentencing hearing was held"); State v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000 (Mont. 1979); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9711(h)(3)(iii) (West 1982) (deleted 1997) (providing that a
court "must affirm ... unless ... the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the circumstances of the crime and the character and record of the defendant");
Commonwealth v. Zettimoyer, 454 A.2d 937 (Pa. 1982). Indiana's Constitution
provides that "[aill penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense."
IND. CONST. art. I, § 16. See, e.g., Saylor v. State, 686 N.E.2d 80, 88-89 (Ind.
1997); Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928 (Ind. 1994); Johnson v. State, 584 N.E.2d
1092 (Ind. 1992); Games v. State, 535 N.E.2d 530 (Ind. 1989). But see Baird v.
State, 604 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1992).
166. See supra note 56 (discussing the Florida statute).
167. Wilson v. State, 751 S.W.2d 734 (Ark. 1988). Arkansas adopted
proportionality review in Collins v. State, 548 S.W.2d 106 (Ark. 1977). Arizona
adopted proportionality review in State v. Richmond, 560 P.2d 41 (Ariz. 1976).
Indiana occasionally conducted proportionality review based on its own
constitution. See supra note 165.
168. The method of conducting proportionality review has been seriously
debated by the state courts. See, e.g., State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1996);
State v. Cobb, 663 A.2d 948 (Conn. 1995); State v. Webb, 657 A.2d 711 (Conn.
1995) (cases in which the court considered and adjusted the class of cases
considered "similar" for proportionality review). See also Tichnell v. State, 468
A.2d 1 (Md. 1983); State v. DiFrisco, 662 A.2d 442 (N.J. 1995); State v. Bland, 958
S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 1983);
State v. Lord, 822 P.2d 177 (Wash. 1992). Some argue that the case before a
court should be compared to similar cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed. Others suggest that the case should be compared with all others in
which the death sentence was sought, regardless of the eventual sentence. The
majority of states used the former approach.
Evaluating the methods of
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there was much debate among courts and judges as to the appropriate method of comparison, 169 comparative proportionality
review led courts on several occasions to conclude that death
in similar cases
sentences were disproportionate to sentences
170
and to set those death sentences aside.
For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court judicially
adopted comparative proportionality review in 1977 in Collins
v. State.1'7 1 In Collins, the court described its appellate review

as including a determination of whether the death sentence
was the result of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor and
whether the sentence was excessive. The "freak" or disparate
death sentence, according to the court, would certainly warrant reversal or reduction on account of its shock to our sense
of justice. The court stated, "There is no specific requirement
that this court compare sentences in other cases; however, the
scope of permissible review of the sentence on appeal would
necessarily require that we consult prior cases as precedent ... .,"172 Notwithstanding its recognition that no "specific
requirement" mandated the comparison of the death sentence
in Collins to other similar cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court
did apply this judicially created review to other cases to invalidate death sentences on comparative proportionality
73
grounds.'

comparative proportionality review is beyond the scope of this article. But see
sources cited supra note 21.
169. See generally Baldus, supra note 21; Bienen, supra note 21; Gilbert,
supra note 16; Lustberg & Lapidus, supra note 16.
170. See Ex parte Henderson, 616 So. 2d 348 (Ala. 1992); Henry v. State,
647 S.W.2d 419 (Ark. 1981); Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1986); Ross v.
State, 474 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985); Caruthers v. State, 465 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1985);
Blair v. State, 406 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1981); Hall v. State, 244 S.E.2d 833 (Ga.
1978); State v. Pratt, 873 P.2d 800 (Idaho 1993); State v. Windsor, 716 P.2d 1182
(Idaho 1985); State v. Scroggins, 716 P.2d 1152 (Idaho 1985); People v. Glecker,
411 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. 1980); State v. Weiland, 505 So. 2d 702 (La. 1987); State v.
Sonnier, 380 So. 2d 1 (La. 1979); Reddix v. State, 547 So. 2d 792 (Miss. 1989);
State v. McIlvoy, 629 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1982); Haynes v. State, 739 P.2d 497 (Nev.
1987); Biondi v. State, 699 P.2d 1062 (Nev. 1985); Harvey v. State, 682 P.2d 1.384
(Nev. 1984); State v. Stokes, 352 S.E.2d 653 (N.C. 1987); State v. Rogers, 341
S.E.2d 713 (N.C. 1986); Munn v. State, 658 P.2d 482 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); see
also State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982) (holding death penalty inappropriate
where reasonable doubt and briefly mentioning proportionality review).
171. 548 S.W.2d 106 (Ark. 1977).
172. Id. at 121.
173. See Henry v. State, 647 S.W.2d 419, 488-89 (Ark. 1983) (modifying
death sentence to life of accomplice to capital murder whose codefendant was
killed by police after comparing sentence to other cases with death sentences and
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In a similar line of cases, the Arizona Supreme Court judicially adopted comparative proportionality review in 1976 in
State v. Richmond.174 Five years later, in holding that "the
death penalty should be reserved for only the most aggravating
of circumstances, circumstances that are so shocking or repugnant that the murder stands out above the norm of first degree
murders, or the background of the defendant sets him [or her]
apart from the usual murderer,"175 the court actually determined that a death sentence was disproportionate to that im176
posed in similar cases.
The Florida Supreme Court's experience with proportionality review proved that comparative proportionality review
eliminated inappropriate death sentences 7 7 "Because death is
a unique punishment, it is necessary in each case to engage in
a thoughtful, deliberate proportionality review to consider the
totality of circumstances in a case, and to compare it with
other capital cases." 78 Thus, the Florida Supreme Court, even
after Pulley, reduced numerous death sentences on the sole
and specific basis that the sentences were disproportionate to
sentences imposed on defendants in other similar cases. 79 In

with sentences to life without parole); see also Wilson v. State, 751 S.W.2d 734,
738 (Ark. 1988) (suggesting that an appropriate system requiring sufficient
findings of aggravating circumstances that outweigh mitigating circumstances
and that support the death penalty would replace the need for comparative
review); Ruiz v. State, 655 S.W.2d 441 (Ark. 1983) (Hickman, J., concurring)
(reviewing court's disposition of all death cases); Sumlin v. State, 617 S.W.2d 372
(Ark. 1981) (reducing sentence after comparison with similar cases in which
sentence was life without parole).
174. 560 P.2d 41 (Ariz. 1976).
175. State v. Watson, 628 P.2d 943, 946 (Ariz. 1981).
176. See id. at 947-48. In Watson, the court declared the death sentence to
be inappropriate in light of the defendant's age, his efforts at rehabilitation, and
the codefendant's life sentences.
177. See Curtis v. State, 685 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1996); Terry v. State, 668 So.
2d 954 (Fla. 1996); Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 1995); Besaraba v.
State, 656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995); Chaky v. State, 651 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1995);
Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1994); Santos v. State, 629 So. 2d 838 (Fla.
1994); Deangelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 1993); White v. State, 616 So. 2d 21
(Fla. 1993); Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991); McKinney v. State, 579
So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1991); Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1990); Farinas v.
State, 569 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1990); Blakely v. State, 561 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1990);
Lloyd v. State, 524 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1988); Proffitt v. State, 510 So. 2d 896 (Fla.
1987); Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1986); Ross v. State, 474 So. 2d 1170
(Fla. 1985); Blair v. State, 406 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1981).
178. Sinclair v. State, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Porter v.
State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 (Fla. 1990)) (emphasis omitted).
179. See supra note 177.
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Florida's experience, utilizing proportionality review was not
"false science,"18 0 but rather true justice: "Our review process
in capital cases insures proportionality among death sentences, and it is an inherent part of our review .... 181
Interestingly, a few states professing to engage in scrupulous proportionality review have never found a death sentence
to be disproportionate.18 2 In Virginia, for example, the state
supreme court has never reversed a death penalty case on any
grounds, while in Tennessee, notwithstanding the vigorous
voice of dissenters, the supreme court has consistently applied
a proportionality test that eliminated compelling cases from ef8 3
fective consideration.
Still, like Florida, most other states that scrupulously applied comparative proportionality review pre-Pulley found that
it had its desired effect. High courts in the majority of the
states with either statutorily or judicially mandated comparative proportionality review encountered death sentences that
needed correcting. The use of comparative proportionality review thus provided a barrier against the arbitrary and dis84
criminatory application of the death penalty.
B.

Pulley's Impact on State Court Comparative
ProportionalityReview

Pulley's impact on state court proportionality review was
dramatic. Indeed, the level of proportionality review since Pulley has declined significantly in the majority of states.1 85 Six

180. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
181. Caruthers v. State, 465 So. 2d-496, 499 (Fla. 1985).
182. Neither Tennessee nor Virginia has ever set aside a death sentence on
proportionality grounds. Georgia has done so only once. See Hall v. State, 244
S.E.2d 833 (Ga. 1978).
183. In virtually every death penalty case in Tennessee between 1990 and
1998, members of the Tennessee Supreme Court criticized the superficial
comparative proportionality review. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561
(Tenn. 1993); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Van Tran,
864 S.W.2d 465 (Tenn. 1993). In State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn. 1997), the
court, in a divided opinion, established the manner in which it would continue to
conduct reviews virtually assuring that no case will ever be set aside on
comparative proportionality grounds.
184. See supra notes 170, 177.
185. A few states, notably Alabama, Florida, Idaho, and New Jersey,
continue to approach the task as they had pre-Pulley, setting aside
disproportionate death sentences.
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states with statutorily mandated proportionality review repealed their proportionality review provisions. 8 6 And even in
those states in which the legislatures did not act to repeal the
mandatory statutory provisions, state courts evidenced an understanding that these proportionality rulings would likely no
87
longer provide a basis for federal review of capital sentences
Furthermore, in most states where comparative proportionality review was judicially created, courts abandoned that
review after Pulley. For example, despite its previous practice
of invalidating death sentences on comparative proportionality
grounds, the Arkansas court, in Williams v. State88 and a
number of subsequent decisions, 8 9 declined to conduct proportionality review, noting that it was not constitutionally mandated. Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court abandoned this
90 Although a majority of
type of review in State v. Salazar.1
the Salazar court simply relied on arguments in a prior deci-

186. Connecticut repealed proportionality review in 1994. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-5-53(b) (Supp. 1998). Idaho also repealed proportionality review in
1994. After repeal the court was required only to find that the sentence was not
"excessive." IDAHO CODE § 19-2827(c) (1997). The Idaho Supreme Court held in
State v. Fields, 908 P.2d 1211, 1225 (Idaho 1995), that deletion of
disproportionality from the statute rendered the remaining requirement
"meaningless" and declined to undertake any review.
Maryland repealed
proportionality review in 1992. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 414(e) (1996).
Nevada eliminated- the requirement that the court consider proportionality in
1985. The requirement that the court consider excessiveness remains. See NEV.
REV. STAT. § 177.055(2)(d) (1997). Oklahoma repealed proportionality review in
1985. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.13(c) (Supp. 1999). Pennsylvania repealed
proportionality review in 1997. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 9711(h)(3)(iii) (West
1998). Wyoming repealed proportionality review in 1989. See WYO. STAT. ANN.

§ 6-2-103(d)(iii) (Michie 1997).
187. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1990); Jackson v. State,
684 A.2d 745 (Del. 1996); State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1992).
188. 902 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Ark. 1995).
189. See, e.g., Willett v. State, 911 S.W.2d 937, 946 (Ark. 1995) ("[W]e no
longer conduct a proportionality review. . . ."); Echols v. State, 936 S.W.2d 509,

546 (Ark. 1996); Sasser v. State, 902 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1995).
190. 844 P.2d 566, 584 (Ariz. 1992). In a case decided the year before
Salazar, State v. White, 815 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1991), members of the court had
disagreed on the subject of continued comparative review. Justice Corcoran had
suggested that the policy be abandoned, see id. at 886 (Corcoran, J., specially
concurring), while Vice Chief Justice Feldman had recommended retaining
proportionality review, see id. at 894 (Feldman, V.C.J., concurring). In State v.
Greeriway, 823 P.2d 22 (Ariz. 1991), the court conducted a proportionality review,
but two justices specially concurred, refusing to join in the proportionality
analysis. See id. at 40 (Moeller & Corcoran, JJ., specially concurring in part).
Salazarwas the first death case.heard by a newly constituted Arizona court.
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sion for its holding, 191 concurring Justice Martone chose to explain his rationale for eliminating the review as follows:
If I thought proportionality reviews would add one iota of
trustworthiness to the capital sentencing process, then I
could well understand, if not agree with, the view that we
should ignore our lack of authority to perform them. But
any review of our cases, simple or exhaustive, belies the
proposition that they do any good.... Our cases reveal that
proportionality reviews are judicial afterthoughts, mere appendages to lengthy opinions. They are performed in a nonadversarial setting, without any pretense at real science.
They require a court to engage in the alchemy of measuring
degrees of depravity among a handful of selected cases. The
pursuit of justice does192not require us to engage in unauthorized false science.
Strikingly, however, some courts in states with statutes
being repealed after Pulley continued to set aside death sentences that were in the system before repeal as disproportionate-a very telling demonstration of some courts' recognition of
the need for comparative proportionality review. In Nevada,
for example, the legislature repealed its proportionality review
statute in 1985.193 Previously, in 1984 and 1985, the Nevada
Supreme Court had set aside death sentences found to be disproportionate to sentences in similar cases. 9 4 In 1987, in the
case of Haynes v. State,195 the court held that Haynes was entitled to proportionality review because his crime had been
96
committed two days before the effective date of repeal1
Finding the death sentence to be disproportionate, the Nevada
197
Supreme Court spared Haynes's life.
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Pratt198 set aside a
death sentence on comparative proportionality grounds just
five months before the legislature repealed the statute requir-

191. See Salazar, 844 P.2d at 584 (citing State v. Greenway, 823 P.2d 22, 40
(Ariz. 1991)).
192. Id. at 584-85 (Martone, J., specially concurring).
193. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.055(2)(d) (1997); supra note 186.
194. See Biondi v. State, 699 P.2d 1062 (Nev. 1985); Harvey v. State, 682
P.2d 1384 (Nev. 1984).
195. 739 P.2d 497 (Nev. 1987).
196. See id. at 504 n.5.
197. See id. at 504.
198. 873 P.2d 800 (Idaho 1993).
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ing proportionality review and left only a requirement that the
court evaluate excessiveness. 199
Following that statutory
change, the court reasoned in a later case that the elimination
of the proportionality language rendered the term "excessive"
meaningless and declined to review death penalties for excessiveness or proportionality. 200 Since no other part of the Idaho
death penalty scheme was altered as a substitute means of reducing arbitrariness, it is fatuous to assume that Idaho juries
do not continue to, on occasion, render disproportionate death
sentences in violation of the Eighth Amendment, just as they
do in every other death penalty state.
Notably, two states, New York and Kansas, which have recently implemented death penalty statutes, have chosen to include proportionality review as part of their statutory
schemes. 20 1 The New York statute requires an evaluation of
proportionality including, upon request by the defendant, a review as to "whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases by virtue
of the race of the defendant or a victim of the crime for which
the defendant was convicted." 20 2 Much less specifically, the
Kansas statute requires a determination of whether the death
sentence "was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor." 20 3 Although not explicit in
its direction, the Kansas statute arguably requires appellate
courts to consider any factor that suggests the death penalty is
inappropriate for the crime, including comparative proportionality.

199. See IDAHO CODE § 19-2827(c)(3) (1997); supra note 186.
See State v. Fields, 908 P.2d 1211, 1225 (Idaho 1995); supra note 186.
201. The only other newcomer to capital punishment-the federal
government-chose not to impose mandatory comparative proportionality review
on federal appellate courts reviewing death sentences. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595
(1994). But see 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (1994); United States v. Curtis, 32 M.J. 252
(C.M.A. 1991) (interpreting Uniform Code of Military Justice provision to require
comparative proportionality review). However, the Justice Department utilizes a
screening process to review decisions of United States Attorneys to seek the
death penalty.
202. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.30.3(b) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
203. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4627(c)(1) (1995).
200.

1999]

V.

STATE COURTS AFTER PULLEY V. HARRIS

851

DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN OTHER EXCESSIVENESS
CONTEXTS

The analytical difficulty in the Supreme Court's conclusion
in Pulley that the Eighth Amendment does not require proportionality review in capital punishment cases comes from its inconsistency with constitutional requirements in other contexts.
When confronted with due process and Eighth Amendment
challenges to punitive damages awards in civil cases and excessive fines claims, the Court has labored to impose constitutional protections that include considerations of proportionality
to other awards and fines. Thus, when loss of property but not
loss of life is at stake, the Court has utilized the Constitution
as a barrier to excessiveness.
A. Punitive Damages
When excessiveness challenges have been raised outside
the sentencing arena in the context of punitive damages, the
Court has labored to provide due process guarantees. Beginning with Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, °4 a tort
action involving payment under an insurance policy, -an insurance company raised ambiguous constitutional challenges
based on the alleged excessiveness of a punitive damages
award rendered by a state court jury. 0 5 The company asserted
that the award violated the "excessive fines" provision of the
Constitution, the Due Process Clause, and the Contract

204. 486 U.S. 71 (1988). Two years prior to Crenshaw, in an Alabama case,
the Court faced a due process challenge to a large punitive damages award, but
the case was resolved on other grounds. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475
U.S. 813 (1986). The Court held that a justice who had filed two actions against
insurance companies alleging bad faith failures to pay claims should have recused
himself from participating in an appeal regarding the propriety of bad faith
awards to partial payment cases. Because the same issue was pending in the
lawsuits filed by the justice, the Court concluded that "Justice Embry's opinion
for the Alabama Supreme Court had the clear and immediate effect of enhancing
both the legal status and the settlement value of his own case .... [W]hen Justice
Embry made that judgment, he acted as 'a judge in his own case."' Id. at 824
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
205. In Crenshaw, the jury awarded $20,000 in compensatory damages
under the "loss of limb" section of an insurance policy. Because the company
refused to pay, the jury awarded an additional $1.6 million in punitive damages.
See Crenshaw, 486 U.S. at 75.
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Clause. 20 6 However, because these claims were not presented
adequately to the Mississippi Supreme Court, the United
20 7
States Supreme Court was barred from considering them.
Still, in a move that would foreshadow her position on whether
a due process analysis was applicable to punitive damages
awards, Justice O'Connor concurred in the Court's decision,
but expressed her belief that the Court should reach the due
208
process issue in "an appropriate case."
As it turned out, it would take awhile for the "appropriate
case" to reach the Supreme Court. Although litigants continued to creatively attack allegedly excessive assessments of punitive damages, 20 9 the failure to properly raise the due process

206. See id. at 75-76.
207. At the state level, petitioner had argued in a petition for rehearing,
that the "punitive damages award 'was clearly excessive, not reasonably related
to any legitimate purpose, constitutes excessive fine, and violates constitutional
principles.'" Id. at 77 (quoting App. to Juris. Statement 139a). The Court
deemed this characterization to be inadequate to satisfy the Webb standard: "At
the minimum... there should be no doubt from the record that a claim under a
federal statute or the Federal Constitution was presented in the state courts and
that those courts were apprised of the nature or substance of the federal claim at
the time and in the manner required by the state law." Id. at 77-78 (quoting
Webb v. Webb, 451 U.S. 493, 501 (1981)) (alteration in original).
208. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor explained:
Appellant has touched on a due process issue that I think is worthy of
the Court's attention in an appropriate case. Mississippi law gives juries
discretion to award any amount of punitive damages in any tort case in
which a defendant acts with a certain mental state. In my view, because
of the punitive character of such awards, there is reason to think that
this may violate the Due Process Clause.
Id. Most interesting is the fact that Justice Scalia, who later became a strong
dissent on the notion of due process application to punitive damages awards, at
least in the substantive context, joined Justice O'Connor's concurrence. See id. at
86; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
209. In 1989, the Court faced a properly preserved Eighth Amendment
challenge to a punitive damages assessment. In Browning-FerrisIndustries,Inc.
v.Kelco Disposal,Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), a Sherman Act case, the defendant
challenged as an "excessive fine" the award of $6 million in punitive damages
when the compensatory award was only $51,146. Declining to go "so far as to
hold that the Excessive Fines Clause applies just to criminal cases," id. at 263,
the Court nonetheless declined relief. "Whatever the outer confines of the
Clause's reach may be, we now decide only that it does not constrain an award of
money damages in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the
action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded." Id. at 26364; see United States v. Bajakajian, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (1998); see also United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1988) (concluding that "a civil as well as a
criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the
individual case serves the goals of punishment" for Double Jeopardy Clause
purposes; because the disparity between the Government's cost and penalty was
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issue forestalled the Court's review until 1991.210 Beginning
in 1991 with Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,211 a
case which involved misappropriation of insurance premiums,
and continuing for the next five years, the Court was finally
able to chart its view of due process limitations on punitive
damages awards in private civil actions. In the end, a divided
Court has deemed the Due Process Clause's procedural and
substantive components as protective guardians against exces212
sive punitive damages awards.

"overwhelmingly disproportionate" suggesting that the penalty was a second
punishment, the Court remanded to allow the Government an opportunity to
demonstrate that its costs were greater than the district court had found).
210. Like the petitioners in Crenshaw, the petitioners in Browning-Ferris
challenged the excessiveness of the punitive damages award on due process
grounds as well. Previewing the debate that would begin with the next case, the
Court noted:
The parties agree that due process imposes some limits on jury awards
of punitive damages ....There is some authority in our opinions for the
view that the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a civil
damages award made pursuant to a statutory scheme, but we have
never addressed the precise question presented here: whether due
process acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award punitive
damages in the absence of any express statutory limit. That inquiry
must await another day [because petitioner failed to raise the claim
below].
Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 276-77 (citations omitted).
In Browning-Ferrisfour concurring Justices evidenced their desire to reach
the substantive issue. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred noting that they
did so with the "understanding that [the majority opinion] leaves the door open
for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive
damages in civil cases brought by private parties." Id. at 280 (Brennan &
Marshall, JJ., concurring). Justices O'Connor and Stevens likewise shared
Justice Brennan's view that "nothing in the Court's opinion forecloses a due
process challenge to awards of punitive damages or the method by which they are
imposed." Id. at 283 (O'Connor & Brennan, JJ., concurring). Justices O'Connor
and Stevens would have applied the excessive fines provision to the award as
well. See id.
211. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
212. In Haslip, a jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to an
insured in a fraud action based upon the misappropriation of premiums by the
defendant's agent. The punitive award was some four times greater than the
compensatory award. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner challenged the award
as a product of unbridled jury discretion and thus violative of the Due Process
Clause.
The Court carefully reviewed the common law method for assessing punitive
damages and the method in place in Alabama. It noted that Alabama juries were
required to initially determine the amount of an award considering the gravity of
the conduct and the need to deter future similar conduct.
After this
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Although the decisions in both Haslip and TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,2i3 a slander of title case in
which the jury awarded $19,000 in compensatory damages and
$10 million in punitive damages, emphasized procedural due
process protections, the Court considered but rejected substantive due process claims in each case as well. Three years later,
however, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,214 a majority
of the Court found a substantive due process violation in the
context of a punitive damages award. In BMW, a case involving a claim by an automobile purchaser for undisclosed repairs, the Court applied the "grossly excessive" test and
declared a $2 million punitive damages award on a $4000
judgment to "transcend[] the constitutional limit."215 The
BMW Court focused on three indicia of excessiveness: (1) the
degree of reprehensibility; (2) the ratio between compensatory
and punitive damages; and (3) the sanctions for comparative
216
misconduct in other cases.
B.

A Comparisonof the Analyses Used in Punitive
Damages and Capital Punishment Cases

The specifics of the Court's due process analysis in the
area of punitive damages is strikingly similar to the analysis
advocated by some Justices in the early capital cases. In both
contexts, the Court has focused on the importance of proce-

determination, the amount was then generally reviewed by the trial and
appellate courts. See id. at 6-10.
The Court then turned to the next inquiry, which it characterized as
"whether the Due Process Clause renders the punitive damages award in this
case constitutionally unacceptable." Id. at 18. Although the particular award in
this case did not offend due process standards, the Court paved the way for
similar arguments in the future. Those arguments were quick to come.
213. 509 U.S.'443 (1993). In TXO Production Corp., the Court reaffirmed
the principle that due process imposed restraints on punitive damages awards in
civil actions. The plurality affirmed a $10 million punitive award in a case
involving $19,000 in -compensatory damages. The Court rejected the tests for
determining the due process limits posed by both parties, choosing to reiterate
the Haslip test: "[a] general concern[] of reasonableness ... properly enter[s] into
the constitutional calculus." Id. at 458 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
Additionally, the Court considered TXO's procedural due process claims, but held
that the procedures were not so lacking in objective criteria so as to offend the
notions of due process. See id. at 463-66.
214. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
215. Id. at 586.
216. See id. at 574-75.
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dural protections, the gravity of the decision, and the need to
control unfettered jury discretion.
First, the Court has emphasized the importance of procedural protections in both contexts. In Haslip, for example, the
Court reviewed Alabama's method for assessing punitive damages. Emphasizing guided jury instructions, individualized assessment of deterrence and retribution, post-trial court review
procedures, and comparative and substantive review on appeal, the Court held that the system was not "so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se unconstitutional. 2 17
Similarly, in TXO Production Corp., the Court concluded that
objective criteria, including jury instructions and both trial
court and appellate review, protected against a valid due process claim.2 18 Thus, the procedural safeguards attendant to a
jury's decision have been deemed important in both the punitive damages and capital punishment contexts. 2 9 As previously noted for example, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court
endorsed the use of clear jury instructions and appellate pro220
portionality review as a means of assuring fairness.
Second, in both capital cases and punitive damages cases,
the Court has emphasized the gravity of the decision. The finality and uniqueness of a death sentence has long been recognized as a reason for heightened scrutiny and "super" due
process.221 Death, quite simply, is different, and must be
treated differently. Akin to the notion that death should not
be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously, certain Justices likewise muse over the "unpredictable and potentially substantial"
windfalls in punitive damages cases. 222 Because of the potential severity of a capital punishment or punitive damages decision, care must be taken to assure that the decision is based on
reason and not on whim, bias, or caprice. 223 In point of fact,

217. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 17.
218. See TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 465.
219. See supra notes 28-44, 213 and accompanying text.
220. See 428 U.S. 153, 195, 198 (1976).

221. This article is not to be read as suggesting that the Court has
accomplished "super" due process, or perhaps, even ordinary due process in many
capital cases.

222. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50 (1979).
223. Compare Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18 ("One must concede that unlimited
jury discretion... may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional
sensibilities."), with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe discretion of judges and juries ...enables the penalty to be
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the concern that the jury's decision would be based on inappropriate considerations was at the heart of Furman and is
also conspicuously present in punitive damages cases. As Justice O'Connor stated in TXO Production Corp.:
[Jiurors are not infallible guardians of the public good.
They are ordinary citizens whose decisions can be shaped by
influence impermissible in our system of justice. In fact,
they are more susceptible to such influences than judges....
Arbitrariness, caprice, passion, bias, and even malice can
replace reasoned
judgment and law as the basis for jury de224
cisionmaking.
A third theme that transcends both inquiries is the fear of
unfettered jury discretion. In capital cases, the Court has cautioned against "a system of law and of justice that leaves to the
uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination
whether defendants.., should die or be imprisoned." 225 Similarly, as to the determination of punitive damages, the Court
has worried that "unlimited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional
sensibilities." 226 In commenting on a state system in which the
amount of punitive damages was left wholly to the jury's discretion, Justice O'Connor commented: "This grant of wholly
standardless discretion to determine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent with due process." 227 Likewise, in
TXO Production Corp., Justice Kennedy stated, "[wihen a punitive damages award reflects bias, passion, or prejudice on
the part of the jury, rather than a rational concern for deter-

selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor... or if he
is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social
position may be ... more protected. .. ").
224. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 474 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Justice O'Connor went on to conclude that in this case the punitive
damages award resulted because "the jury in fact was unduly influenced by the
fact that TXO is a very large, out-of-state corporation." Id. at 489. Justice
O'Connor contends that courts must have the "authority to recognize the special
danger of bias that such considerations create." Id. at 492.
225. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
226.

Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.

227. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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'228
rence and retribution, the Constitution has been violated.
The arbitrariness that resulted from unguided discretion in
death penalty cases similarly led the Court in Furman to conclude that capital punishment, as it was being administered,
violated the Eighth Amendment.
In order to avoid bias and arbitrariness in both contexts,
the Court requires guided discretion in decision making. Usually, the decision maker is the jury, hearing the'evidence in a
single case, and unaware of the results in similar cases. Because of this inexperience, the jury has no benchmark for its
decision. On the other hand, the Court has recognized that decisions by judges in both capital cases and punitive damages
cases should lead to more consistent results "since a trial judge
is more experienced ...than a jury, and therefore is better
able to impose ...similar [sentences or awards] to those imposed in analogous cases." 22 9 In neither context, though, does
the Constitution require the parties to submit the decision to a
judge. Capital defendants at the guilt phase and civil defendants sued for punitive damages are both entitled to a trial by
jury. 230 Thus, the Court, concerned about jury inexperience but
unable to alleviate it by mandating judge trials, has devised
other methods to allay its concerns about jury ifiexperience.
One method is to assure that jurors are carefully instructed. 231 When the arbitrariness of a jury decision is challenged, the Court often analyzes the clarity and usefulness of
those instructions. In Haslip, for example, the Court reviewed
the Alabama jury instructions and found that although the instructions afforded "significant discretion" to the jury, the discretion was not unlimited. 232 Rather, the instructions required
a consideration of the policy concerns behind punitive damages
and required the jury to consider the "character and degree of

228. TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 443 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
229. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S..242, 252 (1976) (footnote omitted).
230. See U.S. CONST.amends. V, VI.
231. Although the Court has frequently shown concern for jury selection in
capital cases, see Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Witherspoon v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 510 (1968), in recent years the Court has exerted more control over juror
qualifications in civil cases as well. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614 (1991).
232. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19.
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the wrong as shown by the evidence and necessity of prevent2 33
ing similar wrong."
Even in light of sufficient jury instructions, the Court has
applauded statutes that go further and provide for critical judicial review of a jury's decision. For example, in capital cases
before Pulley, the Court commended the Georgia and Florida
appellate review provisions. Similarly, in punitive damages
cases, the Court has emphasized trial court review as a means
23 4
of assuring that punitive damages awards are reasonable.
Following this initial trial court review, the Court also has emphasized the importance of meaningful appellate review, which
235
generally includes a comparative assessment of the award.
According to the Court in BMW, even the carefully selected and instructed jury, the conscientious trial court review,
and the comparative appellate court review do not end the inquiry as to whether excessive "property" has been taken in
violation of due process of law. That is because the BMW
Court recognized a federal substantive constitutional right
prohibiting excessive punitive damages awards in civil actions. 236 That due process protection requires an assessment of
the punitive award to determine whether it is "grossly excessive. "237 Determining whether punitive damages are grossly

233. Id. Although the majority found these limitations sufficient, Justice
O'Connor deemed the limitations "deceiving." Id. at 48 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The references to character and degree of the wrong Justice O'Connor deemed as
"too amorphous." Id. Furthermore, the instruction did not address the
relationship between the harm caused and the size of the award and did not
provide any information for comparative purposes. "Inshort, the trial court's
instruction identified the ultimate destination, but did not tell the jury how to get
there. Due process may not require a detailed roadmap, but it certainly requires
directions of some sort." Id. at 49.
234. In Haslip, the Court applauded the Alabama Supreme Court's creation
of post-trial procedures for assessing punitive damages awards. The Court noted
that Alabama trial courts are "to reflect in the record the reasons for interfering
with a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on grounds of excessiveness of the
damages." Id. at 20 (quoting Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379
(Ala. 1986)). The Court detailed with approval the factors that the trial courts
are to consider: culpability of conduct, desirability of discouraging others, impact
on the parties, and others. See id.
235. In Haslip, for example, the Alabama Supreme Court first undertook to
analyze the award in comparison to other awards. Secondly, it applied the
standards adopted to ensure that the award does "not exceed an amount that will
accomplish society's goals of punishment and deterrence." Id. at 21 (quoting
Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222 (Ala. 1989)).
236. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
237. Id.
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excessive involves three inquiries. The first two inquiries
might be referred to as, what Justice White calls, "traditional"
proportionality, "an abstract evaluation of the appropriateness
of [the damages] for [the conduct]."238 The first inquiry is the
degree of reprehensibility. 239 Thus, as in Enmund, in which
the defendant's comparative culpability was at issue, limited
culpability may make a punishment, or an award in the con240
text of punitive damages, per se unconstitutional.
The second inquiry is the ratio between the compensatory
or actual damages and punitive damages. 241 This inquiry, by
definition, focuses on the nature of the conduct that produced
the actual damage and the resulting injury. Although no exact
parallel exists in capital jurisprudence, this inquiry is similar
to the question of culpability raised in Enmund and in Tison.
Proportionality review in the capital context requires an examination of the actual conduct of the defendant as it relates
to the harm actually caused-that is, in most cases, the death
of the victim.
According to the Court, however, traditional inquiries
alone are insufficient to determine whether a punitive damages award "transcends the constitutional limit."242 The third
inquiry, therefore, focuses on sanctions for comparative misconduct. 243 Significantly, this inquiry, which asks whether the
punitive damages award was proportionate when compared
with awards imposed on others for the same conduct, 244 is
similar to what Justice White categorized as "comparative"
proportionality in Pulley.
C. A Comparison of the Analyses Used in Excessive Fines
and Capital Punishment Cases
The Court's very recent excessive fines analysis similarly
reveals heightened protection for property deprivations. 245 In

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1984).
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
See supra notes 80-87, 214-16 and accompanying text.
See BMW, 517 U.S. at 580.
Id. at 586.
See id. at 583.
Compare Pulley, 465 U.S. at 40-41, with BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive fines [shall not be]

imposed." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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United States v. Bajakajian,246 for example, the Court faced an
excessiveness challenge in a forfeiture action. A federal statute required those traveling out of the country with more than
$10,000 in currency to report the amount of currency on a form
when leaving the country. 247 Bajakajian, the defendant, did
not report having more than the statutory maximum and was
arrested for attempting to leave the country with more than
$350,000. The federal government sought the forfeiture of the
$350,000. After the lower courts deemed the entire $350,000
forfeitable, respondent challenged the forfeiture as a violation
of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 248 Although most of the Court's opinion pertained to whether the
forfeiture was in fact a "fine" within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause, the underlying principles of the case are
germane to proportionality issues.
First, the Court held with little difficulty that a grossly
disproportionate fine would violate the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment. 249 Second, the Court articulated the
appropriate standard for assessing constitutionality: "[A] punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is
grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's offense ,"250 in other words, if it offends notions of traditional proportionality.
However, as in the punitive damages cases, the Court's
analysis did not end with an inquiry into traditional proportionality. The Court went on to apply the "grossly disproportional" test by comparing Bajakajian's offense to others to

246. 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998).
247. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (1994).
248. See Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2028.
249. See id. at 2036 ("The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the
forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is
designed to punish.").
250. Id. In arriving at the appropriate standard, the Court acknowledged
that neither the text nor the history of the Excessive Fines Clause gave guidance.
Thus, the Court turned to other "particularly relevant considerations." The first
is legislative deference; the second, the imprecision ofjudicial determination. See
id. at 2037.
"Both of these principles counsel against requiring strict
proportionality between the amount of a punitive forfeiture and the gravity of a
criminal offense, and we therefore adopt the standard of gross disproportionality
articulated in our Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents." Id. at
2037 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983); Rummell v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 271 (1980)).
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whom the statute was meant to apply: "Whatever his other
vices, respondent does not fit into the class of persons for
whom the statute was principally designed: He is not a money
launderer, a drug trafficker, or a tax evader."251 Thus, just as
it did in the punitive damages context, after recognizing that a
grossly disproportionate fine violated the Constitution, the
Court incorporated comparative proportionality into the constitutional test, this time basing its decision on the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause rather than on substantive due process.
Other underpinnings of the Bajakajianopinion are equally
profound. In discussing the lower courts' roles in the proportionality determination, the Court noted that the district
courts and the courts of appeals, when "reviewing the proportionality determination de novo, must compare the amount of
the forfeiture to the gravity of the defendant's offense." 2 2 This
emphasis on the courts' role in assuring proportionality at both
the trial and appellate levels is important. True, in the forfeiture context, a judge, not an inexperienced jury, determines
both the sentence and the amount of the fine based on statutory mandates. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has specifically deemed a proportionality review to be among the trial
judge's responsibilities and has mandated that an appellate
253
court conduct a de novo review.
Thus, as in the civil punitive damages context, the United
States Supreme Court has authored a constitutional test for
assessing whether certain monetary penalties are excessive
that includes comparative proportionality review. In protecting against the imposition of excessive fines, the Court has
obliged judges at both the trial and appellate levels to assure
that a grossly disproportionate fine is not levied and has included a comparative analysis as an element of constitutional
proportionality. Surely, no less is required when the excessiveness feared is the loss of life rather than the loss of funds.

251. Id. at 2038 (footnote omitted).
252. Id. at 2037-38 (footnote omitted).
253. The Court clarified that although the factual findings made by the
district court are accepted unless clearly erroneous, the question of the
constitutionality of the fine calls for a de novo review. See id. at 2037 n.10.
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D. Due ProcessRequires Similar Safeguards in All Three
Areas
The scrutiny with which the Supreme Court has reviewed
alleged monetary excesses, deprivations of property by punitive damages awards under the Due Process Clause, and fines
or forfeitures under the Excessive Fines Clause, attests to the
need for similar, constitutionally based comparative proportionality reviews of sentences in capital cases. There is no
question that the Due Process Clause applies with equal force
to deprivations of life and that "unusual" punishments require
the same standard of constitutional review as excessive fines.
Nor is there any question that those sentenced to the ultimate
penalty of death are entitled to at least the same level of scrutiny as those held liable for punitive damages in civil actions or
fines or forfeitures in criminal ones. Therefore, the Fourteenth
Amendment due process guarantee against disproportionate
punishment requires a comparative assessment of other cases
in both the context of deprivations of property and deprivations
of life.
In short, in defining the substantive due process test for
the excessiveness of punitive damages awards and excessive
fines, the Supreme Court has required inquiry into both
traditional and comparative proportionality. It has declared
that before the deprivation of property under the Fourteenth
Amendment can be constitutional, that deprivation must be
assessed in light of conduct and culpability and in light of
awards or fines in similar cases. 254 Specifically, when the
excessiveness of a- punitive damages award or a fine is
challenged on due process grounds, the Constitution requires
an assessment of comparative proportionality.
Although
Pulley has established that the Eighth Amendment does not
require comparative proportionality review as a component of
a state court's appellate system, Pulley, when read in light of
BMW, which mandates an assessment of comparative
proportionality, and Bajakajian, which compared the
circumstances of Bajakajian's offense to that of others, simply
cannot foreclose a similar Fourteenth Amendment due process
challenge to a capital sentence. Surely, the Court would not

254. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
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condone a system in which the taking of property is subjected
to more rigorous due process protection than the taking of life.
Critics of comparative proportionality review in the context of capital sentences complain that the process is difficult
to administer. 255 Deciding which cases are similar for comparative purposes is difficult. However, that process is no
more difficult to administer in the criminal context than it is in
the civil context. The facts that prompt punitive damages
awards in civil cases or fines in criminal cases are legally as
diverse as circumstances giving rise to death sentences in
criminal cases. All cases have nuances and distinctions that
set them apart from others. Although the Supreme Court has
acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a bright per se proportionality line in the punitive damages context, it has refused to
let that obstacle stand in the way of constitutional inquiry:
"[T]his consideration surely does not justify an abdication of
[the Court's] responsibility to enforce constitutional protections ....,,256 Why should this acceptance of responsibility be
any less in capital cases?
VI.

ESTABLISHING THE NEED FOR COMPARATIVE
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN CAPITAL CASES

Because of comparative proportionality's role in eliminating arbitrary and excessive death sentences, states that no
longer engage in the review, or do so superficially, risk an arbitrary and discriminatory capital system. Quite simply, comparative proportionality review is the only means of assuring
that death sentences are not arbitrarily imposed. In a jury
sentencing system, juries lack the experience needed to evaluate the propriety of a sentence in light of sentences in similar
cases. Likewise, in a judge sentencing system, the trial judge
may be unaware of statewide sentencing practices. Further-

255. See Richard Van Duizend, Comparative Proportionality Review in
Death Sentence Cases: What? How? Why?, STATE CT. J., Summer 1984, at 9.
256. BMW, 517 U.S. at 586 n.41. Justice Ginsburg in dissent in the BMW
case suggested that the Court was putting itself in the place of being the "only
federal court policing" punitive damages awards. Id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, discounting this concern, noted that potential difficulty
does not remove the Court's constitutional obligations. See id. at 586 n.41.
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more, the judge's decisions may be affected by public or politi257
cal pressure.
A. The Role of State Appellate Courts
The current landscape of the death penalty in America
places state appellate courts in a pivotal and essential role for
assuring the appropriate use of the death penalty. The United
States Supreme Court has, in recent years, exhibited an unwillingness to examine system-wide problems and lower federal courts are largely unable to remedy inappropriate'death
sentences due to the restrictions imposed by the federal
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. 258 In the view
of at least two Justices, the Supreme Court "has stripped state
prisoners of virtually any meaningful federal review of the constitutionality of their incarceration." 259 In essence, the federal
judiciary no longer provides "any meaningful oversight to the
state courts as they exercise their authority to inflict the pen'260
alty of death.
This laissez-faire philosophy is further demonstrated by
the Court's view that executive clemency is the appropriate
vehicle for disposing of claims of actual innocence by death row
inmates. 6 1 It is unrealistic to expect governors to commute
death sentences in today's "tough on crime" environment.
Thus, the Court's delegation of its duty to the executive branch
will provide no protection against inappropriate death sentences.
Moreover, the courts cannot expect the legislative branch
to provide safeguards from inappropriate death sentences.
Legislatures certainly will not further narrow capital eligibility
as a substitute check on arbitrariness. In fact, most legisla-

257. See Bright'& Keenan, supra note 140, at 759.
258. See Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant: The Evisceration of
Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to
Protect FundamentalRights, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1997).

259. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1146 n.2 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.) (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 417
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
260. Id. at 1158-59.
261. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). In Herrera, Chief Justice
Rehnquist refers to executive clemency as the "fail safe" of our criminal justice
system arguing that throughout history wrongfully convicted people have been
pardoned once their 'innocence was discovered.
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tures continue to expand capital crimes while some have even
authorized the death penalty for non-homicide offenses. 262 The
legislative branch's political agenda, like that of the executive
branch, steers towards reducing, rather than expanding,
checks on the arbitrariness of the death penalty.
In no other context is the challenge for state courts as
great as assuring the rights of those who face the ultimate
penalty of death. Within the criminal justice system prosecutors often use death cases as political currency. 263 Public defenders, with dwindling resources, are finding it more and
more difficult to provide effective representation in capital
cases. 264
Finally, federal habeas corpus review has been
greatly reduced 265 and the United States Supreme Court has in
recent years indicated an unwillingness to examine systemwide problems in capital cases. 266 Therefore, the state appellate courts are the last bastion to assure that the administration of justice in capital cases in this country does not return to
a pre-Furman system in which the imposition of the death
penalty is based upon arbitrary and discriminatory factors. As
the Supreme Court has recently commented: 'While this Court
has the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution, we grant
review in only a small number of cases. We therefore rely primarily on state courts to fulfill the constitutional role as primary guarantors of federal rights."267 Thus, the mantle has
clearly been passed.
B. The Insufficiency of Other Checks on Arbitrariness
State appellate courts must fulfill their obligation of assuring that arbitrariness does not infiltrate capital jurisprudence in part because other checks on arbitrariness simply will
not accomplish this task. In Pulley, although the Supreme
Court did not issue a wholesale rejection of Eighth Amendment

262. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.42(C) (West 1997) (authorizing the
imposition of death for the rape of a child under twelve).
263. See Bright & Keenan, supra note 140.
264. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not
for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994); Ira P.
Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State Death
Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 65-67 (1990).
265. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266 (Supp. II 1996); Bright, supra note 264.
266. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
267. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 499 (1993).
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claims based on disproportionality, it explicitly approved California's capital punishment scheme because it contained other
sufficient checks on arbitrariness. In endorsing the California
scheme, the Court acknowledged that a system lacking in sufficient checks on arbitrariness would not withstand a constitutional challenge.
Most of the checks that the Court endorsed in the California scheme at issue in Pulley pertained to narrowing the class
of defendants eligible for the death penalty. 268 In approving
the scheme, the Court assumed that by appropriately narrowing death eligibility (and providing for mandatory appellate review) the death penalty could adequately be reserved for the
"worst of the worst."2 69 Such an assumption could not be more
erroneous. Often, the nature of narrowing statutes requires a
comparison that a juror is unable to make. Many states, for
example, have an aggravating circumstance component that
allows the death penalty if the murder is especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel. The very use of the word "especially" connotes a comparison. Jurors, who sit only in a single case, however, have no basis to make that comparison.
Limiting crimes for which the death penalty is a viable
punishment certainly reduces those eligible for death. Likewise, carefully drafted aggravating circumstances may diminish the number of individuals who will receive the death
penalty. Still, the death penalty may be disproportionate even
in a capital murder case if the mitigating circumstances set it
apart from other similar cases. Therefore, neither narrowing
the crimes for which death is an available sentence nor carefully drafted aggravating circumstances provide any check

268. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 51-54. Additionally, the Court noted that the
California statute required trial judges to independently reweigh the evidence to
determine if it supported the jury's verdict, see id. at 52, and that appellate
judges were required to conduct appellate review. See id. at 53. Neither
provision, however, protects against the arbitrary, disproportionate death
sentence. Although California applies a "shocks the conscience" test in evaluating
death sentences, that test focuses only on the crime and the defendant, and does
not take into account sentences imposed by juries in similar cases. See People v.
Ramos, 938 P.2d 950 (Cal. 1997); People v. Davenport, 906 P.2d 1068 (Cal. 1995);
People v. Sanders, 905 P.2d 420, 471 (Cal. 1995) (finding that the defendant was
not entitled to intracase or intercase proportionality review even though
codefendant received life sentence).
269. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 51.
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271
against an inflamed jury27 0 or an overly zealous prosecutor.
A jury can still impose, for example, a death sentence in a robbery-murder case without realizing that thousands of similar
cases, many more aggravated, resulted in life sentences.
Similarly, neither provides any protection against a biased jury
or a racially motivated prosecutor. Only the courts can accomplish that protection; and they can accomplish that task only
through comparative proportionality review.
Because of the nature of state death penalty statutes, the
prosecution's decision to seek the death penalty is unchecked.
Prosecutors in one jurisdiction may seek the death penalty
routinely while others exercise greater deliberation in deciding
in which cases to seek a death sentence. A trial judge has no
authority to question the prosecution's choice of defendants
eligible for death sentences. Generally, jurors are not aware of
those choices. Thus, the jurors make their decision in a vacuum, based only on the facts of the single case before them,
which for most will undoubtedly be the "worst" they have ever
heard.
But, indeed, the defendant may not be the "worst of the
worst." The case may not be one of those "few cases" 272 in
which the death penalty should be imposed. Only the appellate court whose obligation over time has included reviewing
other capital cases can determine whether a defendant's death
sentence is inconsistent with the punishment-usually imposed

270. Victim impact testimony, now admissible under Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991), can have the effect of particularly arousing the jury. For an

article that concludes that the disadvantages of victim impact testimony
outweighs the benefits, see Amy K. Phillips, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People:
The Problem of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 93 (1997).
271. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary
System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669; Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart,
Prosecutorialand Jury Decision-Making in Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18

N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 743 (1991). "The absence of uniform standards
governing prosecutorial discretion heightens the uncertainty and inconsistency in
the administration of the capital murder statute. Derivatively, it ...inevitably
compounds the risk of arbitrary and capricious death sentences." State v. Gerald,
549 A.2d 792, 851 (N.J. 1988) (Handler, J., concurring in part & dissenting in

part).
272. Lowefield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 255 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"Since our decision in Furman... we have required that there be a 'meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death sentence] is imposed

from the many cases in which it is not."'

Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408

U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (alteration in original)).
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for the crime. In effect, appellate judges are the lone bastion
between a properly administered capital punishment scheme
and one that is teeming with arbitrariness and discrimination.
Likewise, the existence of mandatory appellate review of
death sentences, as California had, is insufficient to guard
against arbitrariness. The California statute at issue in Pulley
did require appellate courts to conduct appellate review of
death penalty cases; but the required review only involved the
particular case before the court at the time of review. To be
meaningful, appellate review of death sentences must always
include scrupulous and deliberate comparative proportionality
review. That review must include a comparison of the sentence in the case before the court to sentences in similar cases.
Similar cases should include those in which the death penalty
27 3
was or could have been imposed.
Additionally, the parties should have notice of the cases
the court intends to compare and should have an opportunity
to present arguments about the cases and suggest that the
court compare additional cases. Defendants should be allowed
to raise and point to other similar cases in which the death
penalty was not imposed. Because of the uniqueness of this
review, which in effect requires fact finding by appellate
courts, clearly articulated rules of court should detail the pro-

cedure.

274

C. The Benefits of ComparativeProportionalityReview
Several reasons support the conclusion that meaningful
appellate review of death sentences must include comparative
proportionality review. First, it is ultimately the courts' responsibility to assure that the death penalty is not administered, and does not appear to be administered, randomly.
Respect for the justice system flows from the existence of a
fair, indiscriminate system, not an unfair and selective one. To
this end, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
"olur legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the

273. See supra notes 16, 21.
274. At least one federal district court has found a due process violation in a
state's comparative proportionality review because the defendant "did not have
adequate, meaningful, notice of the procedure to be followed." Harris v. Blodgett,
853 F. Supp. 1239, 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
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laws that govern us.... [Jiudges ... must ... strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system."275 To assure that the death penalty is administered fairly, an appellate
court must compare the case before the court to other cases in
which the death penalty has been authorized.
Secondly, comparative proportionality review helps to reduce the risk of discrimination in the operation of the death
penalty. All too often capital punishment seems to be reserved
for the poor and minorities. Only the appellate judge who witnesses these trends can remedy disparate punishments that
appear to be influenced by prejudice. Due process surely does
not allow the execution of an African American man for a
crime for which a white man routinely is only sentenced to life;
nor does due process allow the execution of those who kill
whites, but not those who kill African Americans. Reducing
the risk of discrimination in the capital punishment system
improves the integrity and, consequently, the public's support
276
for the justice system.
Finally, meaningful appellate review, including comparative proportionality review, would reduce the costs of the capital punishment system. If courts were obliged to set aside
disproportionate death sentences, it would reduce the number
of appeals and the number of postconviction and habeas petitions. Over time, prosecutors would be deterred from pursuing
a capital indictment as a bargaining tool in cases in which the
death penalty is not appropriate, thus reducing the cost of trial
in what would have been a capital case.
CONCLUSION
Only the courts, created to be the "safe asylum in times of
crisis,"277 can assure that we do not devolve to randomly, arbitrarily imposed death sentences excused by the notion that "no
perfect procedure for deciding [when] to impose death" exists. 27 8 The Supreme Court rendered a questionable decision in
Pulley. Since it is unlikely, however, that the Court will recon-

275.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Preamble (1998).

See supra Part VI.A.; see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3(B)(5) (1998).
276.
277.
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(Thomas H.D. Mahoney ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1955) (1790).
278. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
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sider that case, state appellate courts must engage in comparative proportionality review to prevent Eighth Amendment
arbitrariness and ensure due process in capital sentencing.
In a time when attacks on the independence of the judiciary are rampant, a common reaction is to avoid any judicial action that might be viewed as activist. That reaction, however,
only serves to further reduce the independence and integrity of
the American justice system. Instead, it is the obligation of
every judge to "uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary." 27 9 In this most important of judicial functions-determining which lives the Government can take-judges simply must uphold this duty. Only then will the constitutional
mandate that the penalty of death be reserved for "the worst of
the worst," and not administered as randomly as a lighting
strike, be accomplished.

279.
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